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Foreword 
An important factor limiting today's airport capacity is the phenomenon of wake vortices 
generated by aircraft in flight. To avoid aircraft entering the zone of turbulence of another 
aircraft during the approach phase, minimum separation criteria between aircraft were 
published in the 1970's. These separations are expressed in terms of longitudinal distances 
and have since served to provide acceptable safe separations between aircraft at all major 
airports through the use of radar. An integrated Air Traffic Control (ATC) wake vortex safety 
and capacity system (including a controller Human Machine Interface (HMI) used in 
combination with new modified wake vortex safety regulation is expected to provide the 
means to significantly enhance airport capacity. 
 
The main objective of the ATC-wake project is to develop and build an innovative platform 
integrated into the Air Traffic Control (ATC) systems with the aim of optimising safety and 
capacity. This platform will have a test bed environment role:  
• To assess the interoperability of this integrated system with existing ATC systems 
currently used at various European airports; 
• To assess the safety and capacity improvements that can be obtained by applying this 
integrated system in airport environments; 
• To evaluate its operational usability and acceptability by pilots and controllers.  
 
The local installation of an integrated system at European airports will require new safety 
regulation, since the present wake vortex safety recommendations and best practices do not 
take new modified ATC systems into account.  
 
The main expected exploitable project outputs is the integrated ATC Wake Vortex safety and 
capacity platform, which contains as further exploitable elements:  
• Wake Vortex Prediction and Monitoring Systems;  
• Wake Vortex Safety and Separation Predictor;  
• Weather forecasting, now-casting and monitoring systems;  
• Wake Vortex Predictors and monitors;  
• Fast-Time ATC Simulator (upgraded with 'wake vortex modules');  
• Controller Human Machine Interface (HMI).  
 
In addition to these exploitable project outputs, new modified wake vortex safety regulation 
will be proposed. This will strongly enhance the introduction of new systems and procedures 
to alleviate the wake vortex problem. 
 
L. Speijker (NLR) 
ATC Wake Project Manager 
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Executive Summary 
With the steady increase in air traffic, civil aviation authorities are under continuous pressure 
to increase aircraft handling capacity. One potential approach is to reduce the separation 
distance between aircraft at take-off and landing without compromising safety. One major 
limiting factor is that aircraft always give each other a wide berth to avoid eachother wake 
turbulence. With the aid of smart planning techniques, however these distances can be 
safely reduced, significantly increasing airport capacity. The IST project ATC-Wake aims to 
develop and build an integrated system for ATC (Air Traffic Control) that would allow variable 
aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the fixed distances presently applied at airports.  
 
As motivation for the use of ATC-Wake, the WP3 on Safety and Capacity Analysis has 
evaluated the potential safety and capacity improvements. It has been shown that runway 
throughput and delay improves noticeably when the ATC-Wake system is used. 
Depending on the occurrence of favourable crosswind conditions, the increase in runway 
throughput is about 2% for the ATC-Wake SRD operation and 5% for the ATC-Wake SRA 
operation (at a generic airport with average wind conditions). Introduction of a new ATC 
system cannot be done without showing that minimum safety requirements are met. 
ATC-Wake risk assessments intend to be compliant with ESARR4 requirements posed by 
EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulation Unit (SRU). Guidelines for the development of new 
wake vortex safety regulation have been given (using a WV risk management framework 
developed in S-Wake). 
 
The safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operation has been performed in three steps. 
First, as part of the qualitative safety assessment, potential hazards and conflict scenarios 
related to use of ATC-Wake have been evaluated. Second, through use of the ‘classical’ 
WAVIR tool, indicative separation minima dependent on crosswind conditions have been 
determined. As these indicative separation minima do not yet account for crosswind 
uncertainty, as part of the third step, the setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system 
components was further investigated. It appears that the especially the Monitoring and 
Alerting system and Meteorological Forecast and Now-casting systems are crucial and 
sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed.  
 
WAVIR simulations for the SRA operation indicate that reduced separation of 2.5 Nm 
might be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode provided that crosswind is forecasted to be 
above a certain limit. During ATC-Wake arrivals, the Monitoring and Alerting component will 
anticipate potential wake encounters in time (and generate an alert); nevertheless if the 
meteorological forecast information is not accurate and stable enough, this might be 
achieved at the cost of a relatively large number of missed approaches. The simulations 
indicate that, provided that certain requirements are met, about 30% of the approaches might 
be performed with 2.5 Nm aircraft separation in case ATC-Wake is used. 
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WAVIR simulations for the SRD operation also indicate that reduced separation of 90 
seconds can be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode, provided that crosswind is forecasted 
to be above a certain limit. If the accuracy of the wind forecast information is too low, the 
Monitoring and Alerting component could provide a relatively large number of alerts. A 
potential issue is that immediately after take off, i.e. at relatively low altitude, it will not be 
feasible for the pilot to turn away from the wake vortex of a preceding aircraft. Provision and 
use of meteorological now-casting information by the controller will be very beneficial during 
the second departure phase, in order to support the pilot to prepare for a potential encounter 
in case of a sudden change of the wind conditions. 
Qualitative safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operation 
For the operations outlined in the ATC-Wake operational concept, a qualitative safety 
assessment was performed for single runway departures, single runway arrivals and closely 
spaced parallel runway arrivals. It was concluded that for these operations there exist some 
conflict scenarios that may bear potential SAFETY BOTTLENECKS, i.e., the risk may be above a 
maximum tolerable probability. No definitive answers on the acceptability of the risks were 
attained in the qualitative safety assessment, as the results included extensive uncertainty 
bands. Therefore, the analysis was supported with a subsequent quantitative safety 
assessment with support of mathematical models for aspects of the ATC-Wake operations. 
Some safety bottlenecks have been identified, enabling adaptation and enhancements of the 
ATC-Wake operation. The scenarios are: 
• Wake vortex encounter during departure; 
• Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival; 
• Missed approach during single runway arrival; 
• Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on CSPRs; 
• Missed approach during arrivals on CSPRs; 
• Higher traffic rates in TMA, holding, sector, or on runway; 
• Turbulence; 
• More landings in crosswind; 
• Transitions between ICAO and ATC-Wake Separation Mode; 
• Effects on ICAO Separation Mode. 
 
For some of these scenarios, potential enhancements have been proposed, which have 
been addressed by ATC-Wake operational experts in WP4 Operational Feasibility (D4_7). 
Development of human operator models 
Models for the performance of human operators during single runway arrivals have been 
developed (in particular for the ATC supervisor, arrival sequence manager, initial approach 
controller, intermediate approach controller, tower controller and aircraft crews). The models 
describe monitoring, interaction with ATC-Wake systems and decision making of the 
controllers and aircraft crews. The human operator performance models have been 
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developed and included in an integrated model, representing the performance of human 
operators, related aircraft movements, meteorological influences and technical systems 
(surveillance systems, communications systems and ATC-Wake systems). 
Validation of the quantitative safety assessment 
To validate the safety assessment method, a number of activities have been carried out: 
• A comparison between two wake vortex evolution models (VFS and VORTEX) was 
made, taking into consideration conditions far and close from the ground. The models 
seem to predict different behaviour of vortices even for cases without crosswind, i.e. 
further investigation might be needed in order to better understand this phenomena. 
• A comparison between available wake encounter models with different complexity was 
made, including validation against computed maximum bank angles observed during 
wake encounter flight simulations. A fair agreement of the results was noted. 
• A newly developed Petri-Net (PN) aircraft flight path evolution model was validated 
against the AMAAI toolset developed for the analysis of in-trail following aircraft. It was 
concluded that the PN model provides sufficiently accurate results for use in WAVIR. 
Quantitative safety assessment methodology 
For the quantitative assessment of the wake vortex induced risk related to the ATC-Wake 
operation with reduced separation, there are three main issues to consider:  
• The controller working with the ATC-Wake system has to instruct the pilot to initiate a 
wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case an ATC-Wake warning/alert is raised. 
• If one or more ATC-Wake system components provide wrong or erroneous advice, there 
will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might 
be CATASTROPHIC, because reduced separation is applied. 
• The separation distance/time will vary along the flight track, and will usually not be 
exactly the same as the separation minima advised by the Separation Mode Planner. 
 
The 'classical' WAVIR methodology, which originates from S-Wake, has been used to assess 
wake vortex induced risk. To cope with all the above issues, WAVIR has been extended with 
a graph and decision theory based structure. A variety of mathematical models and 
techniques (including fault trees, discrete and continuous Bayesian Belief Nets and vines, 
and Petri Nets) are introduced to incorporate the role of humans working with ATC-Wake. 
The details of the model are described in ATC-Wake D3_5b. 
Evaluation of safe separation distances and capacity 
To determine the crosswind threshold values, above which reduced separation for all aircraft 
combinations may be applied, three simulation studies have been carried out: 
• Single runway arrivals; 
• Single runway departures; 
• Closely spaced parallel runway arrivals. 
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Indicative separation minima have been determined for all three operations, and an initial 
assessment of throughput improvements has been made using analytical models based on 
aircraft spacing, queuing models and sequencing approximation methods. These indicative 
separation minima for the three operations are given in the Table below. A crosswind 
climatology based on 400000 observations at 10 European airports has been used. 
 
Indicative separation minima per crosswind interval for the ATC-Wake operations 
 
Proposed separation Crosswind  
 
Crosswind 
interval 
SRD 
operation 
SRA  
operation 
CSPRA 
operation 
(non- 
segregated) 
CSPRA 
 operation 
(segregated) 
CSPRA 
operation 
(semi- 
segregated) 
Crosswind 
probability 
per 
interval 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO ICAO 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.080 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO ICAO ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.208 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 120s 2.5NM ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.206 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 90s 2.5NM ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.164 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 90s 2.5NM ICAO 3.0NM 3.5NM 0.118 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 60s 2.5NM ICAO 3.0NM 3.5NM 0.081 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 60s 2.5NM 3.0NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.053 
8m/s ≤ uc 60s 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.090 
 
Since 2005, application of the European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-
OCVM) and the use of the Validation Data Repository (VDR) is required by all new 
EC/EUROCONTROL ATM related projects. E-OCVM provides a common approach to 
validation of operational concepts as a pre-requisite for industrialisation and operational 
introduction. A Safety Case, Human Factors Case, Benefits Case and Technology Case will 
need to be produced before the ATC-Wake system can be used at European airports. In this 
respect, a full Safety Case shall take into account the local airport weather climatology and 
specific local ATC/pilot procedures for wake vortex mitigation. 
 
During the validation activities, it appeared that both real (measured) data as well as a 
sufficiently validated aircraft performance and dynamics model for departures are not yet 
available. Sufficient validation of the ATC-Wake single runway departure safety assessment 
results was therefore not possible. It is therefore recommended to extend the well known 
AMAAI toolset (developed for EUROCONTROL) for the analysis of in trail following aircraft 
during arrivals with a module dedicated to departure operations. Wake vortex evolution 
models and wake encounter models for departures also appeared not sufficiently validated. 
 
In view of the above, actual implementation of the ATC-Wake operation at European airports 
is envisaged around 2010 at the earliest. It is recommended to involve airport authorities and 
ATC centres for gathering the required data to build the Safety Case. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
 
With the steady increase in air traffic, civil aviation 
authorities are under continuous pressure to increase 
aircraft handling capacity. One potential approach is 
to reduce the separation distance between aircraft at 
take-off and landing without compromising safety.  
 
One major limiting factor is that aircraft always give 
each other a wide berth to avoid eachothers wake 
turbulence. With the aid of smart planning 
techniques, however these distances can be safely 
reduced, significantly increasing airport capacity.  
 
Aircraft create wake vortices when taking off and landing, restricting runway capacity. These 
vortices usually dissipate quickly, but most airports opt for the safest scenario, which means 
the interval between aircraft taking off or landing often amounts to several minutes. However, 
with the aid of accurate meteorological data and precise measurements of wake turbulence, 
more efficient intervals can be set, particularly when weather conditions are stable. 
Depending on traffic volume, these adjustments can generate capacity gains of up to 10%, 
which has major commercial benefits. The IST project ATC-Wake aims to develop and build 
an integrated platform for ATC (Air Traffic Control) that would allow variable aircraft 
separation distances, as opposed to the fixed distances presently applied at airports. The 
present minimum separation of six nautical miles for small aircraft (coming in behind a larger 
one), and three nautical miles for larger aircraft is designed to counter the problems aircraft 
can encounter in the wake of larger types. If these fixed distances can be reduced in 
favourable weather conditions without compromising safety, then an airport’s aircraft-
handling capacity increases accordingly. For approaches, the aim is to manage separation 
distances down to 2.5 nautical miles, in perfect weather conditions, for all aircraft types 
regardless of size. For departures, the aim is to reduce the time separation between 
departing aircraft to 90 seconds (in favourable wind conditions). 
 
The ATC-Wake system integrates weather and wake sensors, weather forecasting, wake-
vortex prediction system, aircraft-spacing predictors and the air-traffic-controller interface. 
When used with planned new European harmonised safety regulations, it should be able to 
provide airports and aircraft handling organisations with significant increases in accuracy and 
aircraft-handling capacity, while maintaining safety.  
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The ATC-Wake decision-support system and procedures will help air traffic controllers 
decide how long the intervals should be. These procedures are based on laser technology 
called Lidar, which monitors the movement of dust particles through the air. This system is 
used to continually monitor wake turbulence on runways. This turbulence data is combined 
with meteorological data to generate recommendations for intervals, which are displayed on 
the air traffic controller's screen. The recommendations are also used in planning systems at 
air traffic management.  
1.2 Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to evaluate and quantify possible safety and capacity 
improvements when using the ATC-Wake system. Safe and appropriate separation minima 
will be determined for single runways (approaches, departures, mixed mode operations) and 
closely spaced parallel runways. A variety of combinations of leader and follower aircraft, and 
under different wind conditions, will be evaluated. The safety and capacity benefits of the 
ATC-Wake system will be assessed through an analysis of WAVIR assessed separation 
minima for different wind conditions, combined with (cross) wind climatology, in order to 
derive the expected runway throughput improvements when using the ATC-Wake system. 
This comprises as activities: 
• The definition of risk requirements and capacity aims; 
• The execution of a qualitative safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operational concept; 
• The development of a mathematical model for the behaviour of humans (controllers, 
pilots) working with new wake vortex avoidance systems; 
• The extension of an existing wake vortex induced risk assessment model and toolset; 
• The development and implementation of the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner; 
• The execution of a quantitative safety assessment (through fast-time simulations); 
• The validation of the safety assessment; 
• The evaluation of safe separation distances and runway throughput improvements. 
 
A Functional Hazard Assessment of the use of (on-board) instrumentation for wake detection 
warning and avoidance system used in conjunction with the (ground based) ATC-Wake 
system has been performed as part of the I-Wake project. 
1.3 Approach 
The overall approach taken is to start with the derivation of capacity aims, using a series of 
analytical tools and simulation platform developed by EUROCONTROL for providing 
performance predictions for the future ATM system. Several scenarios with capacity 
increases will be simulated, with the aim to derive targets for reduction of delays and 
increase in accommodated flights in the major European airports around 2010 and 2015. 
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Introducing and/or planning changes to the ATM system cannot be done without showing 
that minimum safety requirements will be satisfied. This will be done through a safety 
assessment. In this respect, the wake vortex risk requirements for the ATC-Wake safety 
assessments will be derived from (i.e. intend to be compliant with) the ESARR 4 
requirements posed by EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulation Commission (SRC).  
 
The ATC-Wake safety assessment will be performed in two steps. The first step consists of a 
qualitative safety assessment, so as to identify the hazards and safety bottlenecks 
associated with the proposed operation. This allows for an improvement of the ATC-Wake 
concept, which will then be analysed quantitatively through the use of the NLR WAke Vortex 
Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) methodology and toolset. This second step includes 
estimation of the newly proposed ATC-Wake (reduced) separation minima under favourable 
operational and weather conditions. 
 
Evaluation of wake vortex separation distances have historically been conducted using three 
approaches: (1) Experimental flight test data, (2) Historic operational data, and (3) Analytical 
models. As the ATC-Wake system and operation is still in the design phase, this study 
follows the third approach. The intention is to build sufficient safety confidence, enabling the 
decision makers to decide on operational testing and implementation.  
 
 
 
The evaluation of the wake vortex safety involves the evaluation of the accident risk in the 
ATM system, which inhibits stochastic behavior. The probabilistic safety analysis must (and 
will) be conducted for a traffic mix of aircraft under different weather conditions flying flight 
paths with statistical variations, taking into account stochastic models of wake vortex 
generation, wake vortex encounter, and aircraft/pilot and controller responses.  
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Both in Europe and the United States, newly proposed Concept of Operations for reduced 
wake vortex separation depend heavily on the use of wake vortex prediction and detection 
information, with explicit roles and responsibilities for the pilots and controllers working with 
such wake avoidance systems. The WAVIR tool-set, which has been applied in S-Wake to 
assess the (wake vortex) safety related to current practice single runway arrivals, is therefore 
extended with human performance models (based Bayesian Belief Networks and Petri Nets) 
using expert opinion from active pilots and controllers. 
 
Following derivation of the newly proposed ATC-Wake (reduced) separation distances, the 
potential runway throughput improvements are calculated using analytical models. 
1.4 Document structure 
Section 2 provides an overview/state-of-the-art on existing safety and capacity assessments 
methods and tools, including improvements needed and foreseen. Capacity aims and wake 
vortex risk requirements are described in Section 3. A summary of the proposed ATC-Wake 
concept and system architecture is contained in Section 4. The Section 5 describes the risk 
assessment methodology used. The results from the qualitative safety assessment, 
quantitative safety assessment, and the runway throughput improvement analysis are 
described in Sections 6, 7, and 8 respectively. Section 9 provides the conclusions and 
recommendations. The appendices provide results of the quantitative safety assessments for 
single runway arrivals, single runway departures and closely spaced parallel runways.  
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2 Overview / state-of-the-art 
2.1 Systems and concepts of operation for reduced separation 
Wake vortices are a natural by-product of lift generated by aircraft and can be considered (or 
viewed) as two horizontal tornados trailing after the aircraft. A trailing aircraft exposed to the 
wake vortex turbulence of a lead aircraft can experience an induced roll moment that is not 
easily corrected by the pilot or the autopilot. ATC separation standards, designed for the 
worst-case scenario, have been introduced to ensure operation without a wake vortex 
hazard.  Wake vortex separation standards have a significant impact on airport departure 
and arrival capacity especially at the busiest hub airports. For this reason both the USA 
WakeNet Conops Team and the European Wake Vortex Conops Team (EWVCT) are 
developing technologies and procedures for increased arrival and departure rates at airports 
through reduced separation without an impact on safety.  
 
In Europe, currently three new concepts of operation are under consideration by the 
European Commission and Eurocontrol. The near term procedure involves modification of 
the separation method used during arrivals: here the focus is on introducing Time Based 
Separation at airports with a large frequency of strong headwind conditions. Mid- to long term 
procedures focus on new ground and airborne systems (including ATC-Wake and I-Wake) 
based on real-time prediction and monitoring of wake vortices. 
 
In the USA, currently three concepts of operation are under consideration by NASA and the 
FAA to improve runway flow capacity by reducing separation distances under certain 
conditions. The near-term procedure involves modification of the rules associated with 
closely spaced parallel runways. Here the aim is to enable dependent parallel runway arrival 
operations with parallel runways separated by less than current standards under favourable 
weather conditions. Mid-term procedures involve modification of separation times for 
departures. Long-term systems and procedures (including WakeVAS) aim to execute 
dynamic separation distances based on measurements of weather conditions. 
2.2 Determining wake vortex separation standards 
Prior to the introduction of large wide-body jets, wake vortex upsets or turbulence encounters 
by a trailing aircraft were considered to be “prop-wash” or “jet wash” and not considered a 
flight hazard. The introduction of large wide-body turbojet aircraft with increased weight and 
wingspan in the late 1960’s changed this perception and initiated the detailed study of wake 
vortices and their impact on trailing aircraft. In mid 1969 a series of flight test experiments 
were conducted by Boeing and the FAA to generate detailed information on the wake vortex 
phenomenon. By using smoke towers and probing aircraft, the wake vortices of a B747 and 
B707-320C were characterized.  
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This data provided the basis for wake vortex separation rules adopted by ICAO/FAA: 
• VFR rules – following aircraft remain above of the flight path of the leading aircraft 
• IFR rules – minimum radar-controlled wake separation distances were established for the 
following aircraft based on the weight of the lead and follow aircraft 
 
Although under IFR rules aircraft were categorized by weight, the data from these studies 
identified that a more technically correct way to establish categories of aircraft is by wingspan 
of the trailing aircraft. This was considered impractical to implement and was dropped in 
favour of categorization by weight. With a few exceptions, weight exhibits relatively good 
correlation with wingspan. 
 
A variety of methodologies for Determining Wake Vortex Separation Minima exist: 
• Experimental Flight Test: 
The original separation distances for IFR were established based on the “worst case” 
wake vortex turbulence measurements from the flight test described above, at high 
altitude with low ambient turbulence. Due to the expectation that the increased ambient 
turbulence would disrupt the wake vortices, the actual distances were slightly reduced 
versions of these “worst case” distances. 
• Historic Operational (VFR) Data Analysis: 
Historical data showing the fact that safe operations were consistently conducted 
between 1976 and 1994 by aircraft operating under “see-and-avoid” VFR separation 
rules at distances below the IFR separation regulations, was used as basis for reduction 
of the separation distance between aircraft lighter than the B757 to 2.5 Nm. 
• Safety Assessment based on Analytical Modelling: 
An alternative procedure for determining safe separation distances uses a probabilistic 
approach to assess the wake vortex induced risk between aircraft. Here, the approach is 
to account for statistical variations, taking into account stochastic models of wake vortex 
generation, wake vortex encounter, and aircraft/pilot and controller responses. Simulation 
data from all the models is combined to determine the probability and severity of a wake 
encounter for a given separation time and under different operational and weather 
conditions. 
 
The third method uses probabilistic risk assessment techniques to establish safe separation 
distances on the basis of a predefined risk requirement (target level of safety). As such, this 
method can also be used to assess the safety of newly proposed wake vortex avoidance 
concepts, systems, and procedures. Several issues arise: 
1. What is the required safety level (risk requirement)? 
2. What is the safety level of the current separation standards? 
3. Are the current separation standards overly conservative? 
4. Can the separation standards safely be reduced? 
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These questions, the existing wake vortex safety assessment methods, and the 
improvements needed and foreseen, are addressed in the following sub-sections. 
2.3 Existing wake vortex safety assessment methods 
In Europe, the required safety level for ATM operations is provided by EUROCONTROLs 
Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs). The ESARRs concern use of a qualitative 
and/or quantitative risk based-approach when introducing and/or planning changes to the 
ATM system. Such assessment requires the following aspects of risk criteria:  
• a severity classification,  
• a frequency classification, and  
• a risk tolerability scheme.  
 
The ESARR 4 requirements also states that a combination of quantitative (e.g. using 
mathematical models and statistical analysis) and qualitative (e.g. using good working 
processes, professional judgement) arguments may be used to provide a good enough level 
of assurance that all identified safety objectives and requirements have been met.  
 
Existing wake vortex safety assessment methods, able to assess wake vortex safety of flight 
operations and the associated separation minima in a quantitative way, are: 
• WAVIR, developed by NLR. 
• WakeScene, developed for Airbus. 
• VESA, developed for Airbus. 
• ASAT, developed for the FAA Flight Standards Branch. 
 
WAVIR (WAke Vortex Induced Risk assessment) is a stand-alone risk assessment method, 
based on a modular approach (see the Figure below) in which vortex severity, wake 
encounter severity, and incident/accident risk are being determined subsequently.  
 
Basically it is a three step approach. First evolution of the wake vortex generated by a 
leading aircraft is calculated at a given number of gates along the approach or departure 
path. From this the relative position and strength of the wake vortex can be determined at the 
time that a following aircraft passes the defined gates. Secondly, the effect of the wake on 
the passing (i.e. follower) aircraft is determined. Depending on the aircraft model used this is 
expressed either in a single disturbance parameter (induced roll angle) or a combination of 
disturbances (in the lateral and vertical axes). Finally these disturbances are translated to a 
certain hazard category. The set-up of the model allows Monte Carlo simulations, with 
varying meteorological conditions, aircraft types, etc. to estimate the frequencies of certain 
risk events in a certain scenario. The outcome of the risk assessment (incident/accident 
probability per movement) can then be compared with a target level of safety in order to 
establish the anticipated acceptability of the operation. 
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Figure 1 – Wake Vortex Induced Risk assessment (WAVIR) model 
 
Risk requirements can be set for e.g. the encounter probability per movement or for 
incident/accident risk events defined on the basis of ICAO Annex 13 (for incident/ accident 
investigation) and the JAR 25.1309 (for aircraft system hazard categorisation). 
 
WAVIR has been used in S-Wake to assess the wake vortex safety of current practice single 
runway operations. In ATC-Wake, WAVIR has been extended to the whole airport 
environment (including departures). The roles and reaction times of pilots and controllers 
working with wake vortex concepts and procedures is explicitly modelled and analysed. 
 
The WakeScene (Wake Vortex Scenarios Simulation) Package also allows to assess the 
relative encounter probability behind different wake vortex generating aircraft within a domain 
ranging from the final approach fix to threshold (i.e. approach phase of flight only). 
WakeScene supports Monte-Carlo Simulation as well as prescribed parameter variations and 
generates statistical evaluations. The package consists of elements that model traffic mix, 
aircraft trajectories, meteorological conditions, wake vortex evolution, and potential hazard 
area. The Aircraft Speed Model provides time, speed, and mass of generator and follower 
aircraft at the different gate positions, using point-mass aircraft models, based on the BADA 
database. The Flight-Path Deviation Model computes random deviations from nominal glide 
path which are derived from measured flight path deviations. A Meteorological Data Base 
comprises a one-year statistics of meteorological conditions for the Frankfurt terminal area 
which were produced with the weather forecast model system NOWVIV. Based on vertical 
profiles of environmental conditions and aircraft parameters, the Probabilistic Two-Phase 
Wake Vortex Decay and Transport Model simulates the development of wake vortex 
trajectories, circulation, vortex core radius, and attitude of wake vortex axes. The module 
Simplified Hazard-Area Prediction (SHAPe) computes the required distance between wake 
vortex and follower aircraft on the basis of a hazard zone around a wake vortex. 
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VESA (Vortex Encounter Severity Assessment) has been developed by Airbus to assess and 
compare aircraft reactions and the effects of vortex encounters behind various aircraft. As 
such, VESA support air traffic service providers and national aviation safety regulators, which 
need assurance of the separation standards if modifications of the current system are 
proposed. An application is to assess if the operational safety of the existing aircraft is 
maintained after the introduction of the A380. VESA uses 6 DOF aircraft simulation models 
and aerodynamic (strip or panel methods) to calculate the response to a wake vortex 
encounter. The VESA model employs both autopilot and pilot models to calculate the 
response in a closed loop fashion. The resulting aircraft response is then used to determine 
the encounter severity. The VESA concept focuses on the comparison of probabilities to 
exceed certain hazard levels for aircraft combinations. 
 
ASAT (Airspace Simulation and Analysis for TERPS) is a collection of models and 
simulations that can be used to analyze safety and risk factors for a large range of aviation 
scenarios. ASAT has recently been extended with the AVOSS Prediction Algorithm (APA), 
so as to assess the probability of a wake encounter behind a variety of leader aircraft and 
under different weather conditions. APA is based on Sarpkaya’s “out of ground effect” decay 
model, and therefore not valid for encounters close to the ground. The heart of the system 
consists of the high fidelity engineering flight dynamics models of three Boeing aircraft (737, 
767, and 747) against which the lesser models normally used in the high speed simulations 
are frequently checked.  Model performance is also driven by empirical data collected in flight 
simulators and flight tests. In addition to these aircraft simulation models ASAT comprises 
models of aircraft avionics (FMS, autopilot, etc.) based on real equipment, models of ground 
navigation aids, etc. In this respect the simulation models resemble the models as for 
instance used in auto-land certification. Through the use of APA, the simulation tool can also 
generate and track wake vortices and identify encounters between wakes and aircraft in the 
scenario. As such ASAT/APA can also be used for wake vortex risk assessments of new 
concepts and procedures. 
2.4 Existing capacity analysis methods and tools 
For estimation of potential capacity improvements, when using the ATC-Wake system and 
supporting operational concept, it is important to distinguish the following metrics: 
• Unconstrained demand: the expansion of air traffic demand as expected and desired by 
the airspace users to maintain and develop growth of their businesses. 
• Accommodated demand: the maximum number of flights that can be scheduled by users 
under given capacity conditions, taking all ECAC network effects into account. 
• Un-accommodated demand: those flights, which are unable to obtain slots in desired 
airports at the desired time of the day (i.e. flights which will not even be scheduled). 
• Reduction of delays: improvement in average delay per flight for an airport. 
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EUROCONTROL has developed a series of tools and simulation platforms useful for 
providing performance predictions for the future ATM system, in terms of delay at the 
European level given a number of potential scenarios concerning the evolution of both 
capacity and demand. These tools represent the only such European-wide environment 
capable of faithfully replicating the operations of the CFMU and resultant network interaction. 
It is possible to assess the impact on ATFM delay and system access at a chosen time 
horizon resulting from changes in the “supply-side” (airport capacity limits).  
 
TAAM (Total Airspace and Airport Modeller) is an ATC fast-time simulator, able to simulate 
ground, terminal area and en-route operations. TAAM provides details about aircraft 
movements, including departure and arrival flow rates, delays, runway utilisation and 
occupancy times, taxi in and taxi out times, and also gate delays.  
 
In addition to these two simulation platforms, a variety of analytical models for capacity 
estimation exist worldwide. These analytical models are based on aircraft spacing models, 
queuing models, and sequencing approximation methods for the arrival and departure flows. 
Such models might be useful for estimation of the runway throughput improvements, when 
using ATC-Wake in combination with an AMAN or DMAN. 
2.5 Verification and validation of risk assessments 
Wake vortex safety assessment methods will most likely be used by authorities for the 
approval of new ATM systems, concepts and procedures, as well as newly designed high 
capacity aircraft. in this respect it is important to verify and validate both the overall approach 
taken and the sub-models included. Unfortunately, at present no validated wake vortex 
safety assessment method exists. In fact, it is presently not fully known how the various 
model assumptions and simplifications in the models described in Section 2.3 affect the risk 
assessment results. Therefore, part of the research will have to focus on the comparison of 
the models used with historical data, flight simulator data, and validated flight path evolution 
models. In this respect, the following sources are relevant: 
• NLR Aviation Safety database; 
• Wake encounter flight simulator data (e.g. from S-Wake); 
• Databases with wake vortex measurements (e.g. from Memphis, Dallas Forth Worth); 
• AMAAI modelling toolset for the analysis of in-trail following dynamics during arrivals. 
 
Comparison of simulation results with these data sources will provide an indication which 
simplifications are allowable, and where models are sensitive to the modelling structure and 
parameters. 
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3 Capacity aims and risk requirements 
3.1 Capacity aims 
Capacity increase may impact the overall air transport network – using “delay” and “access” 
as the measures of performance impact. EUROCONTROL has developed a series of 
analytical tools and simulation platforms useful for providing performance predictions for the 
future ATM system. The aim of such tools is to provide a consolidated performance 
prediction in terms of delay at the European level given a number of potential scenarios 
concerning the evolution of both capacity and demand. The analytic environment is indicated 
in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – EUROCONTROL simulation platform for ATM performance predictions 
 
At the heart of the analytic environment is an ATFM simulator that simulates the slot 
allocation process of the CFMU. The model therefore takes as input both ‘supply-side’ 
(capacity) and demand-side (individual flight plans) data and allocates departure slots in the 
same way as the CFMU. These tools represent the only such European-wide analytical 
environment capable of faithfully replicating the operations of the CFMU and resultant 
network interaction. Using the above framework, it is possible to assess the impact on ATFM 
delay and system access at a chosen time horizon resulting from changes in the “supply-
side” (airport capacity limits). As the time horizon for performance analysis becomes more 
protracted, the quality of the predictions concerning traffic growth and capacity provision 
necessarily decrease. More than ever-such performance predictions should be considered in 
the framework of a ‘what-if’ rather than as a prediction of the future state of the ATM network. 
Nevertheless, the principal aim is not to attempt to provide detailed performance predictions, 
but rather to provide indications of the potential sensitivity of the ATM network to changes in 
the balance between demand and supply (flight numbers, available capacity).  
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The process is illustrated in Figure 3. Basically, the methodology consists of 7 steps: 
• Step A Development of the Baseline Scenarios 
• Step B Traffic Growth Forecasts (STATFOR) 
• Step C Traffic Augmentation Methodology  
• Step D Airport capacities and un-accommodated demand 
• Step E En-route capacity evolution 
• Step F Airport capacity scenarios study 
• Step G Performance predictions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – EUROCONTROL methodology for determining airport capacity aims 
 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 present unconstrained, accommodated, and un-accommodated demand 
until 2020 for the 10 major airports (Paris-CDG, Frankfurt, London Heathrow, Amsterdam, 
Madrid, Brussels, Copenhagen, Zurich, Rome and London Gatwick).  
 
unconstra ined
0
200.000
400.000
600.000
800.000
1.000.000
1.200.000
1.400.000
1.600.000
2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
year
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f m
o
v
em
en
ts
Paris C harles de  G aulle
London H eathrow
Frank furt am  M ain
Am sterdam  Schipho l
M adrid Bara jas
Brussels N ational
C openhagen A irport
Zurich A irport
R om e F ium ic ino
London G atw ick
 
Figure 4 – Unconstrained demand forecast 
+
+
Observed 
baseline 
performance
ATFM
Simulation
2005future
en-route capacity 
growth
Future traffic 
forecasts
STATFOR
Performance 
predictions
(Given in % compare 
to the baseline)
Alternative assumptions 
concerning demand and 
capacity growth (5,10 and 
15% capacity increases in 
the 10 target airports)
A
B
C
Airport capacity 
Current and future
D
E
G
F
ATC-WAKE D3_9, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
 
13 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Accommodated demand forecast 
 
 
Figure 6 – Un-accommodated demand forecast 
 
Several scenarios with 5%, 10% and 15% additional (over and above that of the “do-nothing” 
scenario) capacity increases in 10 target airports have been simulated. The following future 
traffic samples were built:  
• 2010 and 2015 samples with airport capacity increases corresponding to those known to 
EUROCONTROL (baseline case). 
• 2010 and 2015 with a 5% increase in capacity surplus for the target airports. 
• 2010 and 2015 with a 10% in capacity surplus for the target airports. 
• 2010 and 2015 with a 15% incapacity surplus for the target airports. 
 
Figures 7 and 8 below gives the resulting reduction of the airport delays (red bars) and the 
en-route delays (yellow bars) for the whole ECAC region for 2010 and 2015 respectively. At 
the ECAC level, for 2010 a significant reduction in airport delays at the global level can be 
observed: 8.5% for 5% and 26% for 15% compare to the “do nothing” scenario. We note that 
the En-Route delay remains almost constant. For 2015, an increase of 15% of the capacity in 
the 10 target airports implies a reduction of 32% of the airport delays on the ECAC zone. 
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Figure 7 –  Airport delay change for 2010 
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Figure 8 – Airport delay change for 2015 
 
Figure 9 shows the benefit of the capacity increases for each of 10 major European airports 
for 2010. The red bars represent the improvement in average delay per flight; this 
improvement is given in percentages of reduction compared to the baseline and the scale is 
the red one on the left. The yellow curves represent the increase in demand accommodated, 
in simple words the flight surplus. This demand increase is also given in percentage of 
change compared to the baseline and the scale is the yellow one on the right side of the 
graph. We can observe that the capacity increases in those airports manifest themselves in 
two different ways: the delay reduction and more accommodated flights. The combination of 
these two effects depends on the characteristics of each airport, relating mainly to the daily 
traffic distribution and the significance of the lack of capacity. In general terms, we usually 
observe that the higher the number of new accommodated flights, the lower is the delay 
reduction. If we look more in detail, we can note that for a big part of the airports studied, the 
capacity increase implies essentially a reduction of delay with a very limited impact in terms 
of accommodated flights. For 9 of 10 airports (the exception being Madrid), the additional 
number of flights that can be accommodated is less then 3% and often close to 0. 
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Figure 9 – Benefits of capacity increases for the 10 major airports for 2010 
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The benefits in terms of delay reductions can easily be translated into cost. For this purpose, 
the figures contained in the PRR4 can be used. The average airport delay prediction for 2015 
is over 5 min per flight with a predicted traffic over 40,000 flights a day. The benefit of 
increasing the capacity in some airports is significant and often, a few gains in capacity can 
allow a huge delay reduction (this is due to the exponential shape of the delay sensibility to 
the traffic). This shows that by working on a limited number of airports, the average airport 
delay can be reduced significantly. 
 
Table 1 – Costs of delays 
 Cost of delay (in € per min of delay) 
ATFM delay 40 to 66 
Reactionary delay 28 
Total direct cost 68 to 94 
Indirect cost undergo by the society 
(passengers…) 
46 to 60 
Note: PRC assumes that each minute of primary delay is responsible for 0.5 minute of reactionary delay. 
3.2 Risk requirements 
 
3.2.1 Overview of ATC-Wake approach 
Introducing and/or planning changes to the ATM system cannot be done without showing 
that minimum risk requirements will be satisfied. This can be done through a qualitative 
and/or quantitative safety assessment. The main issue is the choice of the safety criteria. 
The risk assessments in the ATC-Wake project intend to be compliant with the ESARR 4 
requirements posed by EUROCONTROL’s Safety Regulation Commission (SRC). Following 
the ESARR4, a safety assessment requires the following risk criteria aspects: 
• A severity classification, 
• A frequency classification, 
• A risk tolerability scheme. 
 
The ESARR 4 requirements also states that a combination of quantitative (e.g., mathematical 
model, statistical analysis) and qualitative (e.g. good working processes, professional 
judgement) arguments may be used to provide the required level of assurance that safety 
objectives and requirements have been met. To assess safe and appropriate separation 
minima, a quantitative assessment will need to be performed. In the ATC-Wake qualitative 
safety assessment, the ESARR 4 severity classification, will be used. Five severity classes 
are distinguished: accident, serious incident, major incident, significant incident, no safety 
effect. The definitions of occurrence, accident, and incident are specified in the ESARR2. 
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For execution of the quantitative safety assessment, the Wake vortex risk management 
framework defined in the S-Wake project will be used. Here, incident/accident risk 
probabilities will be determined followed by a comparison with risk criteria. The following 
classification, which is based on ICAO Annex 13 for incident/ accident investigation and JAR 
25.1309 for aircraft system hazard categorisation, will be used: 
• Catastrophic accident: aircraft encountering Wake hits the ground, with loss of life; 
• Hazardous accident: the Wake vortex encounter results in one or more on-board fatalities 
or serious injuries (but no crash into the ground); 
• Major incident: the Wake vortex encounter results in one or more non-serious injuries, but 
no fatality, on-board the encountering aircraft; 
• Minor incident: the Wake encounter results in inconvenience to occupants or an increase 
in crew workload. 
 
The method proposes that all four risk requirements are to be satisfied, i.e. the most stringent 
requirement will determine the required separation minima (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 – Risk requirements (per queued aircraft movement) 
             Risk event Proposed Target Levels of Safety 
             Catastrophic Accident 0.9 × 10-8 
             Hazardous Accident 3.0 × 10-7 
             Major Incident 1.0 × 10-5 
             Minor Incident 5.0 × 10-4 
 
This approach supports two commonly accepted rationales for acceptance of a new system 
(or procedure) by showing that the number of Wake vortex induced risk events: 
• does not exceed some pre-defined, and agreed upon, safety requirement; 
• does not increase with the introduction of a new ATM procedure. 
 
Nevertheless, this approach still needs to be further harmonised with the ESARR4. 
3.2.2 Elaboration of ESARR4 requirements 
ESARR 4 documentation has been used to derive appropriate risk criteria for use in the ATC-
Wake qualitative safety assessment. In this respect, the results intend to be compliant with 
the ESARRs. The severity classification is taken directly from the ESARR4 (Table 3). The 
frequency classification has been derived from the ESARRs to judge the acceptability of a 
number of conflict scenarios that may occur. 
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Table 3 – ESARR 4 severity classification scheme in ATM 
Severity class 
Number Term 
Examples of effects on operation 
1 ACCIDENT • One or more catastrophic accidents. 
• One or more mid-air collisions. 
• One or more collisions on the ground between two aircraft. 
• One or more Controlled Flight Into Terrain. 
• Total loss of flight control. 
No independent source of recovery mechanism, such as surveillance 
or ATC and/or flight crew procedures can reasonably be expected to 
prevent the accidents. 
2 SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
• Large reduction in separation (e.g., a separation of less than half 
the separation minima), without crew or ATC fully controlling the 
situation or able to recover from the situation. 
• One or more aircraft deviating from their intended clearance, so 
that abrupt manoeuvre is required to avoid collision with another 
aircraft or with terrain (or when an avoidance action would be 
appropriate). 
3 MAJOR 
INCIDENT 
• Large reduction (e.g., a separation of less than half the separation 
minima) in separation with crew or ATC controlling the situation 
and able to recover from the situation 
• Minor reduction (e.g., a separation of more than half the separation 
minima) in separation without crew or ATC fully controlling the 
situation (without the use of collision or terrain avoidance 
manoeuvres). 
4 SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
• Increasing workload of the air traffic controller or aircraft flight crew, 
or slightly degrading the functional capability of the enabling CNS 
system. 
• Minor reduction (e.g., a separation of more than half the separation 
minima) in separation with crew or ATC fully controlling the 
situation and fully able to recover from the situation. 
5 NO SAFETY 
EFFECT 
No hazardous condition, i.e., no immediate direct or indirect impact on 
the operations. 
Frequency classification 
In the qualitative safety assessment, frequency classes need to be defined for severity 
outcomes of conflict scenarios. The severity and frequency classes together are used to 
define risk tolerability. The ESARR 4 requirements do not specify these frequency classes, 
but only provide the maximum tolerable probability of ATM directly contributing to an accident 
of a Commercial Air Transport aircraft. The ESARR 4 requirements currently leave freedom 
to define the details of risk criteria that are required to conduct a safety assessment, such as 
maximum tolerable probabilities of incidents and risk budgets of conflict scenarios. According 
to the ESARR 4 requirements, the maximum tolerable probability of ATM directly contributing 
to an accident of a Commercial Air Transport aircraft is 1.55×10-8 accidents per flight hour or 
2.31×10-8 accidents per flight. These maximum tolerable probabilities are based on: 
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• historical accident data in the ECAC region over the period 1988 to 1999, 
• a target for the maximum ATM direct contribution to the total number of accidents of 2%, 
which is based on historical data for accidents with at least one ATC primary cause and a 
factor that accounts for allowance of variations in the scope of source data (ATS, ASM 
and ATFM in addition to ATC), for statistical error, and for adopting a conservative 
approach to offer additional protection to the future, 
• requirement that the number of accidents in 2015 may not be higher than in 1999, 
• an annual traffic increase of 6.7% for the period 1999 to 2015. 
 
The scope of the current qualitative safety assessment is wider than accidents and incidents 
with a direct ATM contribution, such as used in the ESARR 4 requirements. It is not limited to 
occurrences where at least one ATM event or item was judged to be directly in the causal 
chain of events, but aims to cover ATM direct and indirect occurrences. However, a 
maximum tolerable accident probability of ATM indirectly contributing to an accident of a 
Commercial Air Transport aircraft has not been specified by the ESARR4 requirements. It is 
now proposed to use the target of 1.55×10-8 accidents per flight hour or 2.31x10-8 accidents 
per flight is for the maximum tolerable probability for accidents with direct and indirect ATM 
contributions. This is a conservative approach, which obviously implies that the ESARR4 
requirements are satisfied. 
 
The target levels of safety are expressed in occurrences per flight. The current qualitative 
safety assessment does not consider the risk of a whole flight, but considers the risk of the 
ATC-Wake operations. As such it is needed to determine what budget of the total ATM 
related risk of 2.31x10-8 accidents per flight can be provided to the presently assessed 
operations. In the ATC-Wake qualitative safety assessment the risk is evaluated per conflict 
scenario. For this purpose, it is assumed that the ATM related risks of a whole flight can be 
represented by 25 conflict scenarios, and that each has an equal risk budget. Using these 
assumptions the maximum tolerable probability of an ATM related accident is about 1×10-9 
accidents per conflict scenario. In line with risk criteria of JAA, in the qualitative safety 
assessment it is assumed that the maximum tolerable probabilities of serious and major 
incidents are, respectively, a factor 1×102 and 1×104 higher than for accidents. The frequency 
terms and the associated probabilities as derived in this section are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 – Frequency categories used in this study 
Frequency category Probability of occurrence 
PROBABLE Higher than 10-5
 
per conflict scenario 
REMOTE Between 10-7
 
and 10-5 per conflict scenario 
EXTREMELY REMOTE Between 10-9
 
and 10-7 per conflict scenario 
EXTREMELY IMPROBABLE Lower than 10-9 per conflict scenario 
ATC-WAKE D3_9, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
 
20 
 
 
4 ATC-Wake systems and operation 
4.1 ATC-Wake: two modes of operation 
For the definition of the ATC-Wake operational concept and procedures, the principle of 
evolution not revolution has been retained. As far as possible, existing concepts and 
procedures for arrivals and departures have been reused. In this context, the proposed 
evolution of ATC-Wake operations impacts on working methods, in order to allow: 
• Safe and efficient use of wake vortex detection and prediction information; 
• Determination and implementation of appropriate separation between aircraft; 
• Sequencing of approach and runway operations in a seamless way. 
 
Depending on weather conditions influencing Wake Vortex transport out of so-called arrival 
or departure critical areas, two modes of aircraft separation have been defined:  
• ICAO standard separation; 
• ATC-WAKE separation. 
 
To implement a concept with 2 modes of operation, four ATC-Wake components are 
introduced (Table 5), which will interface with existing ATC systems (see Table 6). 
 
Table 5 – ATC-Wake System Components 
ATC-Wake 
Separation Mode  
Planner 
Determines the applicable separation mode (ICAO mode or ATC-WAKE 
mode) and advises about minimum aircraft separation distance. 
The advisory includes the expected time for future mode transitions, 
and an indication of the aircraft separation minimum applicable 
ATC-Wake  
Predictor 
Predicts for individual aircraft the WV behaviour ( “Wake Vortex Vector”)  
in the pre-defined arrival or departure area(s). 
The WVV is part of the critical area (e.g. ILS Glide Slope) potentially 
affected by the wake vortex 
ATC-Wake  
Detector 
Detects for individual aircraft the WV position, extent (“vortex vector”) 
and – if possible – also strength in the pre-defined arrival or departure 
area(s)  
ATC-Wake  
Monitoring and  
Alerting 
Alerts ATCO in case of : 
• significant deviation between WV detection and WV prediction 
information which raises the risk of WV encounter 
• failure of one or several WV components 
 
ATC-WAKE D3_9, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
 
21 
 
 
Table 6 – Existing ATC Systems interfacing with ATC-Wake components 
ATCo HMI Provides the traffic situation picture and automated support for various 
ATCO tactical roles (Approach, Tower). 
Arrival Manager Determines automatically optimum arrival sequence and provides 
advises for realising this sequence. Communicates forecast sequence 
upstream to en-route and / or approach ATSUs 
Flight Data 
Processing 
System 
Keeps track of every flight information and updates, in particular the 
flight plan, the trajectory prediction, ETA and ETD, aircraft type and 
equipment. 
Surveillance 
System 
Provides and maintains the air traffic situation picture using all available 
detection means (radars, air-ground data links) 
4.2 ATC-Wake Users or Involved Actors 
The ATC-Wake users, including their proposed roles, are given in Table 7 below. 
 
Table 7 – ATC-Wake Users or Involved Actors 
Actor Current Responsibility Specific/additional Role in ATC - WAKE 
Airport ATC 
Supervisor 
Monitors ATC tower and ground 
operations 
Decides on arrival and departure 
separation mode and in case of ATC-Wake 
separation decides on the rate to be 
applied 
Arrival Sequence 
Manager 
In charge of arrival planning 
management for one or several 
runways, in co-ordination with 
adjacent ATC Units (sequencing 
and spacing of aircraft can be 
assisted by an arrival manager 
tool (AMAN) 
Uses WV prediction information for 
determination of aircraft sequencing and 
spacing in the final approach corridor 
(according to the separation mode decided 
by the ATC Supervisor) 
Co-ordinates forecast sequence upstream 
to en-route and / or approach ATSUs 
Initial Approach 
Controller (INI) 
In charge of inbound traffic from 
initial approach fix (IAF).  
Responsible for holding stacks 
management. 
Establishes arrival sequence based on 
WV.   
Intermediate 
Approach Controller 
(ITM) 
In charge of intermediate 
approach, ILS interception 
Establishes sequence for final 
approach and landing 
Establishes final approach sequence 
based on WV prediction and informs about 
deviations 
Tower Controller 
(TWR) 
In charge of final approach, 
landing, and take-off phases 
Monitors safe and optimal separations 
using WV detection and short term 
forecasting of the WV displacement. 
Instructs aircrew on any necessary evasive 
action. 
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Actor Current Responsibility Specific/additional Role in ATC - WAKE 
Ground Controller 
(GND) 
Organises and monitors aircraft 
and vehicles ground movements 
Sequences departures according 
to landings 
Uses WV detection and short term 
forecasting of the WV displacement to 
optimise departure sequencing 
Aircrew Navigates aircraft safely Complies with Controller’s instructions to 
meet arrival sequence constraints based 
on WV prediction information 
Takes necessary evasive actions to avoid 
WV encounter if instructed by ATC or 
alerted by on-board equipment (I-WAKE). 
4.3 Aircraft Separation Modes 
Based on meteorological conditions, ATC-Wake will advise the ATC Supervisor about 
applicable separation mode and associated validity period (start / end). The ATC Supervisor 
has the responsibility to decide the minimum separation to be applied for approach or 
departure as well as the landing rate to be used for arrival sequencing (using AMAN or not). 
The time horizon to be considered for arrival sequencing is 40 min if an AMAN is used, 20 
min otherwise. Based on planned traffic and meteorological conditions (wind profiles), an 
assessment of WV transport and decay is performed in order to advise the ATC Supervisor 
about the applicable minimum separation for a fixed period of time (start / end of ATC-Wake 
operations). The transition from ICAO to ATC-Wake separation mode will begin by 
considering the incoming or departing aircraft that have a planned arrival time included in the 
start / end time period for ATC-Wake operations. The re-planning of arrivals (if necessary) 
will be performed by the Arrival Sequence Manager or by AMAN and transition information 
will be distributed to concerned ATCOs. The time adjustments will be implemented by en-
route controllers. This will be done through speed modifications, radar monitoring and/or 
holding patterns.  
17:10
14:30
11:50
ICAO
ATC WAKE
08:20
ATC WAKE
ICAO
Arrivals  :  2.5 NM
Departures : 90 s
Arrivals  :  2.8 NM
Departures : 100 s
07:29 Mode transition at 07:40
Brussels – 25 L / 25 R
 
Figure 10 – Example of a Planning of Separation Modes 
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4.4 ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner  
To support the ATC supervisor with planning of separation modes, an ATC-Wake Separation 
Mode Planner (SMP) has been developed and implemented. In the proposed methodology, 
NOWVIV wind forecast data is used to determine time frames suitable for reduced 
separation. Criteria on crosswind and/or head/tailwind and associated safe separation 
minima are derived from safety assessment results. To enable an interfacing between the 
Separation Mode Planner and the WAVIR safety assessment results, a WAVIR database 
has been set up. This database also enables users to review WAVIR parameter settings and 
retrieve WAVIR results via interfaces. In the context of “safety monitoring”, such database 
might be used to evaluate wake vortex safety performance indicators at an airport. Results 
from safety monitoring activities can also be fed back in the WAVIR database to tailor the 
database to specific airports, and to increase the performance and reliability of the 
Separation Mode Planner. In this first design of the Separation Mode Planner, relatively 
simple wind criteria have been proposed. Depending on the benefits that can be achieved 
with such criteria and the requirements of the users, further study may focus on elaborating 
these criteria.  
 
SMP methodology
NOWVIV wind forecast data in grid points in approach corridor
Composition of ‘compound’ profile by selection of relevant vertical areas per 
grid point
Determine minimum and maximum crosswind profile 
as function of time (including uncertainty bands)
Determine time frames for reduced separation by 
comparison with crosswind criterion (show only time 
frames longer than e.g. 45 minutes).
This logic can be extended with head/tailwind profiles 
and with a crosswind criterion that is height 
dependent.
1
2
3
 
Figure 11 – SMP methodology, example case for a single runway approach 
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The functional design of the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner is described in detail in 
D3_5A. The seven steps in the process to obtain an advice on separation mode and minima 
are shown in Figure 12. 
 
S t e p  1 :  D e t e r m i n e
• R u n w a y  t h r e s h o ld  c o o r d i n a t e s
• R u n w a y  o r ie n t a t i o n
• O p e r a t io n
• N o m i n a l  f l i g h t  p a t h
S t e p  2 :  D e t e r m i n e
• R e l e v a n t  N O W V I V  g r id  p o i n t s
• R e l e v a n t  v e r t ic a l  r a n g e  p e r  g r i d  p o i n t
S t e p  3 :
D e t e r m i n e  m i n i m u m  w i n d  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  e n a b le  r e d u c e d
s e p a r a t i o n ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  W A V I R  s a f e t y  a s s e s m e n t  r e s u l t s
S t e p  4 :
O b t a i n  N O W V I V  f o r e c a s t  d a t a  f o r  t h e  n e x t  3  h o u r s
S t e p  6 :  D e t e r m i n e
• T i m e  f r a m e s  t h a t  r e d u c e d  s e p a r a t i o n  c a n  b e  a p p l ie d
• M i n i m u m  c r o s s w i n d  / h e a d w i n d  p e r  id e n t i f i e d  t i m e  f r a m e
• M i n i m u m  s e p a r a t i o n  t h a t  c a n  b e  a p p l ie d  a c c o r d i n g  t o
W A V I R  s a f e t y  a s s e s s m e n t  r e s u l t s  f o r  w i n d  c o n d i t io n s  t h a t
s a t i s f y  m i n i m u m  c r o s s w i n d  /  h e a d w i n d  i n  p a r t ic u l a r  t i m e
f r a m e
S t e p  7 :
P r o v i d e  t h e  A T C  S u p e r v is o r  H M I  w i t h  t h e  t i m e  f r a m e s  i n  w h i c h
r e d u c e d  s e p a r a t io n  c a n  b e  a p p l ie d  a n d  w h a t  t h e  m i n i m u m
s e p a r a t i o n  s t a n d a r d s  s h o u l d  b e  i n  t h e s e  t i m e  f r a m e s .
S t e p  5 :  D e t e r m i n e
• R e l e v a n t  N O W V I V  f o r e c a s t  d a t a
• C o m p o u n d  w i n d  p r o f i l e s  a lo n g  t h e  f l i g h t  p a t h
• M i n i m u m  c r o s s w i n d  /  h e a d w i n d  p r o f i l e s  a s  a  f u n c t io n  o f
t i m e ,  m i n i m i s e d  o v e r  ( r a n g e s  o f )  v e r t ic a l  f l ig h t  p a t h .
U p d a t e  i f  n e w  N O W V I V  d a t a
c o m e s  a v a i la b l e
 
 
Figure 12 – Functional steps of the Separation Mode Planner 
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The proposed Graphical User Interface for the determination of the applicable Separation 
Mode and distance/time to be applied by the ATC supervisor is given in Figure 13 below. 
 
 
Figure 13 – Separation Mode Planner Graphical User Interface 
4.5 ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting 
It is assumed that the Wake Vortex situation will be monitored by comparing results of 
prediction and detection. From ATC supervisor or operator viewpoint a typical refresh rate of 
such information is 30 min. In case of a discrepancy between prediction and detection 
information, an alert is provided to the controllers, who may instruct the pilot to initiate a wake 
vortex avoidance manoeuvre. To support the controllers with the monitoring and alerting 
procedure, Human Machine Interfaces have been developed. 
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The output of the ATC-Wake Predictor is the Wake Vortex Vector (WVV) of an aircraft in a 
so-called critical area. This information is presented as an enhancement on a Plan View 
Display (PVD). The PVD shows the information received from the airport radar, combined 
with flight track data. Because the WVV is only calculated in the critical area (an area close 
to the glide slope) only changes to the PVD of the Final Approach controller and Tower 
controller are foreseen. For the Approach controllers, the so-called "Variable Wake Vortex" 
HMI has been developed and tested with active controllers from five countries (see Figure 
14). New is the blue coloured vector behind each aircraft, representing the WVV and varying 
(using information from the Predictor) along the glide slope. Also a micro-label with the 
distance to the preceding aircraft is proposed. 
 
 
Figure 14 – ATC-Wake HMI for the approach controller 
 
In case of an alarm, the colour of the WVV will change to orange and an audio alarm will be 
raised (Figure 15). The selected HMI and ATC-Wake concept have been received very well 
by the controllers, which certainly support the expected benefits of the concept. 
 
 
Figure 15 – ATC-Wake alarm for Tower controllers 
In case of a caution of alert, the air traffic controllers shall perform the following actions: 
• Caution: the other air traffic controllers shall be informed, but no instruction to the pilot is 
needed; 
• Alert: a missed approach or turn instruction is required, and the pilot shall initiate it as 
soon as practicable. 
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4.6 ATC-Wake System Architecture 
The ATC-Wake Operational System includes four new functional components, which will 
interface with several existing and/or enhanced ATC system components. The new 
components are:  
• ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner,  
• ATC-Wake Predictor,  
• ATC-Wake Monitoring and Alerting, and  
• ATC-Wake Detector.  
 
Existing ATC systems are: Arrival Manager (AMAN) or Departure Managers (DMAN) (if in 
use), Flight Data Processing System, and Surveillance Systems. Enhanced ATC systems 
are: Meteorological Systems, Supervisor HMI, and ATCo HMIs. For the Meteorological 
systems, enhancements in prediction and update rates are foreseen and the HMI's for 
supervisor and ATCo shall be extended with ATC-Wake symbology. Four use cases are 
identified: Separation mode planning, Transition between ICAO and ATC-Wake separation 
mode, Approach phase, and Departure phase. Figure 16 shows all relations between the 
different components. 
 
Figure 16 – Functional flow of ATC-Wake Operational System  
The use of the ATC-Wake system components, including the ATC-Wake Predictor and ATC-
Wake Detector, are described in more detail in D1_5 (System Requirements), D2_12 
(System Design and Evaluation) and D4_7 (Evaluation of Operational Feasibility). 
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5 Risk assessment methodology 
5.1 Overview of qualitative risk assessment methodology 
The risks associated with the ATC-Wake operation have been assessed with NLR’s 
Qualitative Safety Assessment methodology. This methodology is based on structured use of 
operational experts' judgement, supplemented with historical data, if available. 
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Figure 17 – Stepwise overview of the qualitative safety assessment methodology 
 
In step 0 the objective of the study is determined, as well as the safety context, the scope 
and the level of detail of the assessment. The actual safety assessment starts by determining 
the operation that is assessed (step 1). Next, hazards associated with the operation are 
identified (step 2), and clustered into conflict scenarios (step 3). Using severity and frequency 
assessments (steps 4 and 5), the risk associated with each conflict scenario is classified 
(step 6). For each conflict scenario with a (possibly) UNACCEPTABLE risk, safety 
bottlenecks are identified (step 7), which can help operational concept developers to find 
improvements for the operation. Should such an improvement be made, a new cycle of the 
safety assessment should be performed to investigate whether all risks have decreased to 
an acceptable level. A risk tolerability matrix specifies the acceptability of the risk of an 
occurrence for a conflict scenario, based on combination of its severity and frequency. The 
matrix in Table 8 will be used. 
 
In the assessment, any operational aspect fully satisfying requirements from for instance 
ICAO and EUROCONTROL are assumed to have no unacceptable risks associated with them. 
In particular, in some cases risks are assessed using comparisons to the current operations. 
In these cases, it is assumed that the current operation has a TOLERABLE risk at most, unless 
the operational expert interviews indicate that this is not the case. 
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Table 8 – Risk tolerability matrix for accident and incidents 
SEVERITY 
FREQUENCY 
ACCIDENT SERIOUS INCIDENT MAJOR INCIDENT SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
PROBABLE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE 
REMOTE UNACCEPTABLE UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE 
EXTREMELY 
REMOTE 
UNACCEPTABLE TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE 
EXTREMELY 
IMPROBABLE 
TOLERABLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE NEGLIGIBLE 
5.2 Overview of quantitative risk assessment methodology 
 
5.2.1 Introduction: the WAVIR toolset 
For a quantitative assessment of the wake vortex induced risk related to the ATC-Wake 
operation with reduced separation, there are three main issues to consider:  
• The controller working with the ATC-Wake system has to instruct the pilot to initiate a 
wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case an ATC-Wake warning/alert is raised. 
• If one or more ATC-WAKE system components provide wrong or erroneous advice, there 
will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might 
be CATASTROPHIC, because reduced separation is applied. 
• The separation distance/time will vary along the flight track, and will usually not be 
exactly the same as the separation minima advised by the Separation Mode Planner. 
 
The 'classical' WAVIR methodology, which originates from S-Wake, is used to assess wake 
vortex induced risk in case the ATC-Wake system is not working (i.e. no wake vortex 
avoidance manoeuvre is performed by the pilot, and worst case conditions apply). This 
assessment of wake vortex induced risk has been performed with the WAVIR tool-set, 
version 2.0, which is based on probabilistic models. The model structure and user interfaces 
are described in D3_5b. In short, the WAVIR tool-set includes four sub-models for:  
• flight path evolution 
• wake vortex evolution 
• wake encounter simulation 
• risk prediction 
 
To assess the risk related to the ATC-Wake operation, WAVIR is extended with a graph and 
decision theory based model structure. A variety of mathematical models and techniques 
(including fault trees, discrete and continuous Bayesian Belief Nets and vines, and Petri 
Nets) are introduced to incorporate the role of humans working with ATC-Wake. The details 
of the mathematical model are described in ATC-Wake D3_5b. 
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5.2.2 Assessment of wake detection, warning & avoidance manoeuvre 
The execution of the ATC-Wake detection, warning, and avoidance manoeuvre (e.g. turn 
away from a wake vortex (during departures) or a missed approach (during arrivals)) 
depends - besides operational feasibility - on the probability of failure of the ATC-Wake 
system components. For the ATC-Wake system failures, a causal model has been 
constructed using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs). It is shown that this resulting BBN might 
be represented by a fault tree as given in Figure 18 (see D3_5b). 
 
 
Figure 18 – Fault tree for the WV DWA probability 
 
The nodes in this (high-level) Fault Tree representation have the following explanation: 
• ATC-Wake DWA Failure: represents the probability of aircraft/pilot not able to initiate the 
ATC-Wake DWA manoeuvre (e.g. a turn away from WV of a preceding aircraft). 
• Aircraft/Pilot not able to turn timely: represents the probability of an aircraft/pilot not able 
to perform the ATC-Wake DWA manoeuvre, when requested by the controllers. 
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• ATC-Wake Warning Failure: represents the probability not providing a timely warning to 
the flight crew when one should be given. As a result, it is possible that a pilot reacts later 
to a wake encounter when one should occur. 
• Controller does not provide a timely warning: represents the probability of the ATCo not 
providing an alert, when it is advised by the Monitoring and Alerting system 
• Monitoring and Alerting Failure: represents the probability of not providing a timely 
warning to the air traffic controllers when one should be given. As a result, the ATCo 
might NOT be able to initiate/instruct the pilot to perform an evasive action. 
• Loss of DWA Tactical Function: represents the probability of an undetected loss of the 
Monitoring and Alerting Function. In case of a Detected Loss, the ATCos are aware that 
NO cautions/alerts will be given and a transition will be made to the ICAO Mode (the 
separation will increase, and the DWA manoeuvre will not be necessary). 
• Improper Model Prediction: represents the probability that the predictions of Wake Vortex 
locations and strength are inaccurate/wrong. 
• Inaccurate or Faulty WV Model Estimation: represents the probability that the predictions 
of wake vortex locations and/or strengths made by the WV Model, on the basis of aircraft 
data and meteorological data, are inaccurate/wrong. As a result, incorrect information is 
passed to ATC-Wake Predictor, causing improper functioning 
• Inaccurate or Faulty Air Traffic Situation: represents the probability that the air traffic 
situation provided by the surveillance systems is inaccurate or wrong. As a result, 
incorrect information is passed to the Predictor, causing improper functioning. 
• Inaccurate of Faulty Meteo Nowcasting: represents the probability that the meteorological 
conditions (i.e. now-casting data) provided by the meteorological systems are inaccurate 
or wrong. As a result, incorrect information is passed to the ATC-Wake Predictor, causing 
improper functioning. 
• Improper Detector Performance: represents the probability that the ATC-Wake Detector 
(e.g. LiDAR) performs significantly less than the air traffic controllers expect (while they 
are not aware of the inaccuracies) (i.e. inaccurate/wrong alerts are given); 
• Wake Vortex Outside Detection Range/Scanning Volume: represents the probability that 
the ATC-Wake Detector does not detect the wake vortices of the leading aircraft, 
because these are outside the scanning volume of the ATC-Wake Detector. 
• Inaccurate or Faulty Detection of Wake Vortices: represents the probability that the ATC-
Wake Detector does not detect wake vortices of the leading aircraft accurately, when 
these are inside the planned scanning volume of the ATC-Wake Detector(s). 
5.2.3 Assessment of the ATC-Wake aircraft separation time 
In reality, the actual separation time will differ from the advise provided by the Separation 
Mode Planner. This is related to e.g. role of the humans in the decision making process as 
well as aircraft performance.  
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The spread of inter-arrival times at Atlanta runway 27 was analysed by the George Mason 
University in 2002. The resulting number of occurrences observed at Atlanta runway 27 is 
provided in Figure 19 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19 – Spread of inter-arrival times observed at Atlanta runway 27 (source GMU) 
 
The relatively large spread of observed inter-arrival times at the runway threshold is related 
to the variations in initial separation distances between leader and follower aircraft at the 
Final Approach Point (FAP) and the variation of aircraft speed during the approach.  
 
A model of the intermediate approach controller performance, which is based on Petri Nets, 
has been used to determine the initial separation between the leader and the follower aircraft 
at the FAP. This initial separation is composed of a nominal separation plus a stochastic 
variation due to control actions up to the FAP. The latter contribution is described by a 
variation time chosen from a Rayleigh distribution shown in Figure 20, which is independent 
from wind conditions, aircraft types or required separation distance.  
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Figure 20 – Probability density function (left) and probability distribution (right) of the difference 
between the actual and planned separation times at the FAP 
 
For departures, the stochastic initial aircraft separation time at the start of roll can be 
modelled through the use of a causal model, e.g. based on BBNs (see Figure 21).  
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Figure 21 – BBN for the initial aircraft separation time during ATC-Wake departures 
 
The explanation of the nodes in the BBN is given in Table 9. The probability distributions for 
the nodes in the BBN have been derived from the results of interviews with seven pilots and 
two controllers (see ATC-Wake D3_6b for the full details). This BBN can be used to analyze 
the influence of the stochastic variables in Table 9 on the initial aircraft separation time. 
 
Table 9 – Explanation of the nodes in the BBN for the Aircraft Separation Time 
Stochastic 
variable 
Explanation 
Aircraft TO 
Separation Time 
Time difference between start of roll of the leader and the follower aircraft 
ATCo Take Off 
Clearance Time 
Time difference between start of roll of the leader and take off clearance of the 
ATCo for the follower aircraft 
Pilot Take Off 
Time 
Time difference between take off clearance of the ATCo and the start of roll of 
the aircraft 
Prescribed Time 
Spacing 
Separation Time prescribed by the ATC supervisor (in ATC-Wake Mode) 
SMP Failure Time difference between output of the SMP (i.e. Separation Time Advise) and 
the actual Wind Now-casting 
Wind forecast 
error 
Meteorological system wind profile forecast error at reference height (10 m 
altitude) 
Wind now-cast 
error 
Meteorological system wind profile now-cast error at reference height (10 m 
altitude) 
Error runway/ 
tower controller 
Time difference between Separation Time prescribed by the ATC Supervisor 
and Take Off Clearance Time 
Error ATC 
supervisor 
Time difference between SMP Separation Time and Separation Time 
prescribed by the ATC Supervisor 
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In both cases (arrivals and departures), the resulting stochastic distribution for the initial 
separation time can be used as input for the 'classical' WAVIR tool in order to assess the 
incident/accident risk in relation to the advise provided by the SMP (see also Appendix A). 
5.3 Validation and verification of the sub-models 
 
5.3.1 Wake vortex evolution models 
As shown by LIDAR measurements in real aircraft wakes the wake vortex transport and 
decay is very sensitive to the ambient weather conditions (winds, turbulence, atmospheric 
stability are all spatial-temporal variables). This complicates the prediction of wake vortex 
transport and decay and also the validation of the models against measured LIDAR data, for 
which the actual ambient weather conditions at the measurement site are only approximately 
known. Parametric studies with CFD methods and analysis of LIDAR measurements have 
nevertheless helped to understand the prime transport and decay mechanisms of vortex 
pairs in different weather conditions, cross-wind shear conditions and vortex interaction with 
the ground. This enabled the development of simplified wake vortex evolution models such 
as the simple point vortex method VORTEX, the multiple point vortex methods VFS and P-
VFS (Vortex Forecasting System, VFS, and its probabilised version P-VFS.  
 
A somewhat different approach is followed in the P2P method, which implicitly takes into 
account the variability/uncertainty of weather. A comparison of VFS and VORTEX models 
was made in a parametric study (deterministic). Both conditions far and close from the 
ground were considered. All the models use slightly different initialisation, modelling 
assumptions, model constants and treatment of vortex interaction with the ground. Though 
each of the models has been carefully tested and verified by the modellers (usually against 
the same LIDAR data sets), the differences between the model predictions are sometimes 
considerable, especially for conditions close to the ground. Figure 22 shows as an example a 
direct comparison between the VFS and the VORTEX model for a range of (non-
dimensional) Eddy Dissipation Rates (denoted with EDR) and stratification conditions 
(denoted by the Brunt-Väisälä parameter N). In these simulations the initial vortex strength 
was 500 m2/s, their lateral spacing was 50.6 m and there was no wind. 
 
Both methods use Sarpkaya’s EDR decay model for atmospheric turbulence, albeit with a 
different value for modelling constant C (C=0.45 for VORTEX and C=0.3 for VFS). This 
reflects the amount of uncertainty in measured LIDAR and/or corresponding weather data 
that were used for the model validations. It explains why with the VORTEX model the 
vortices decay faster (and sink less) under turbulence (EDR) conditions than with the VFS 
model. The predicted stratification effects are quite similar for both models. In conclusion, out 
of ground effect, both models behave very similar if the same value for modelling constant C 
would have been used. 
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a) VORTEX model    b) VFS model 
Figure 22 – Comparison of VORTEX & VFS predictions for vortices out of ground effect 
 
Close to the ground the situation is more complex because within VORTEX and VFS quite 
different models for the treatment of ground proximity are employed. The VORTEX model 
employs mirror vortices (below the ground) for the primary vortices only and when the 
primary vortices reach the so-called rebound height (0.6bv) secondary counter rotating 
vortices are introduced directly below the primary vortices, at a height of 0.1bv above ground. 
The strength of the secondary vortices is taken as a constant fraction (appropriate value 
somewhere between about 0.3 and 0.7) of the strength of the primary vortices. 
Corresponding mirror images of the secondary vortices are not taken into account however, 
so proper ground reflections are not fully satisfied.  
 
The VFS model uses a different approach for the introduction of secondary vortices close to 
the ground. A comparison of VORTEX and VFS predictions for vortices created near the 
ground is given in D3_4. It was concluded that both models predict quite different behaviour 
of vortex trajectories even for cases without cross-wind. For cases with cross-wind the 
VORTEX model predicts weak effects on vortex tilting whereas the VFS model predicts much 
more pronounced vortex tilting and delay of vortex decay for the downwind and much 
increased vortex decay for the upwind vortex due to wind shear effects. This is illustrated in 
Figure 23, for vortices created at 60m height in crosswind.  
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VORTEX/VFS results: G0=500m2/s, V=75m/s, b0=50.6m, z0=60m, N=0.02, edr=0.002; wind at 10m =2.5m/s
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VORTEX/VFS results: G0=500m2/s, V=75m/s, b0=50.6m, z0=60m, N=0.02, edr=0.002; wind at 10m =5m/s
 
a) Uc= 2.5 m/s     b) Uc = 5 m/s 
Figure 23 – Comparison of VORTEX and VFS predictions for vortices created at 60m  
 
For vortices created in ground effect (say created below the height of one wingspan) the 
wake roll-up is influenced by the presence of the ground and the assumption of fully rolled up 
(point) vortices (as used in VORTEX, VFS and P2P) is perhaps no longer really appropriate. 
Therefore the VFS method was adapted. A comparison of results for wakes created at only 
30m above ground with either the normal UNified Wake (UNW: with limited number of 
vortices) or the Wake Roll-Up (WRU with up to 500 vortices) method is shown in Figure 24 
for t=0, t=10 and t= 50s, both for zero and 1 m/s cross-wind. The coloured dots show the 
vorticity centroids and the crosses show for comparison the vorticity centroid from the other 
initialisation method. The differences between the two results remain quite small (at least 
until about t=50 s). Therefore, within ATC-Wake project wake roll-up is fully neglected. 
However, the necessity for wake roll-up simulations close to the ground will be further 
investigated within the FAR-Wake project.  
 
The work on idealized cases was followed by an application of VORTEX, VFS and P2P 
models against specific Dallas Forth Worth (DFW) and Memphis data as well as a 
comparison against some wind line data from Frankfurt airport (data supplied by DFS). This 
latter part of the work will not be discussed here, it has been presented during the combined 
WakeNet-USA and WakeNet2-Europe Workshop, New Orleans, 27-29 April 2004.  
 
From the model verification and validation exercise it was concluded that modelling in NGE 
and IGE situations is still not well established and that continuous efforts are needed to 
improve and calibrate the models. The collection of high quality LIDAR measurements also 
remains of utmost importance. An in-depth analysis of wakes in ground effect is currently 
made in the FAR-Wake project and outcomes should be taken into account in future safety 
assessment studies.  
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a) t=0 s, no wind    b) t=0 s, cross-wind 1 m/s 
 
c) t=10 s, no wind    d) t=10 s, cross-wind 1 m/s 
 
 
e) t=50 s, no wind    e) t=50 s, cross-wind 1 m/s 
Figure 24 – Comparison of VFS results for vortices created at 30m above the ground  
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5.3.2 Wake encounter models 
In WAVIR, three models of different complexity are available to compute the wake encounter 
upsets. The simplest model that can be used is the roll-control ratio (RCR) model, which 
computes the wake induced rolling moment divided by the available roll-control power for a 
given position of the aircraft with respect to the wake vortices. A somewhat more realistic 
model is the Extended Roll Control Ratio (ERCR) model, which computes for a given wake 
induced rolling moment (computed as with the RCR method described above) an estimate of 
the maximum wake induced bank angle. It is based on a one degree of freedom (1-DOF) roll 
model of Tatnall. The aircraft is assumed to be aligned with the wake vortices (zero wake 
intercept angle) and therefore does not move with respect to the wake vortices (frozen 
aircraft position). The duration of the encounter needs therefore to be limited in order to 
prevent infinite roll. Suitable (aircraft type dependent) wake encounter duration times Tv were 
derived by Tatnall such that the 1-DOF model predicts equal maximum roll angles as the 
more elaborate 3-DOF model. This wake encounter duration time Tv implicitly accounts for 
the dynamic aspect of the encounter. The maximum bank angle is the most important output 
of this model, but the roll-control ratio (RCR) is an output too which can be used to classify 
encounter severity. As an example the computed bank-angles for three aircraft types placed 
instantaneously in the vortex core of a Medium Jet or a large Jumbo Jet are shown in figure 
25. A worst case condition was assumed: vortex decay was neglected, a small vortex core 
radius size (0.025b) and a rather conservative pilot reaction time (0.6s) were taken.  
 
For a Large Jumbo Jet behind a Large 
Jumbo Jet the RCR is equal to 2.8 and for a 
Large Jumbo Jet behind a Medium Jet it is 
still equal to 1.8. So when there is no vortex 
decay and the vortex core remains small, 
according to this conservative estimate, 
even a Large Jumbo Jet can not fly stable in 
the vortex centre of a Medium Jet aircraft.  
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Figure 25 – Example of computed bank angles with ERCR model (worst case conditions)  
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A flight dynamics model based on a 5-DOF flight mechanics model (the airspeed being kept 
constant) is also available. This model needs more computation time and in the probabilistic 
framework of WAVIR it is therefore only used for the more severe wake encounter situations. 
The roll-control ratio (which can easily be computed with the simple RCR model) is used as a 
pre-selection criterion for cases that need to be considered with the RAPM model.  
 
The RAPM model is (almost) capable to simulate the complete motion of the encountering 
aircraft. However, simplified aerodynamic coefficients are used: locally linearized behaviour 
around the given flight operation point. For given initial conditions (flight track direction and 
speed) it provides as a function of time:  
• aircraft position (vertical, longitudinal, lateral), 
• vertical and lateral speeds and accelerations, 
• aircraft attitude angles, 
• angular rates and accelerations (roll, pitch and yaw). 
 
The aerodynamic effect of the wake vortices on the aircraft is taken into account through a 
more advanced model than in the RCR and ERCR models. A strip model is used to model 
the forces on wing, vertical tail and horizontal stabiliser. Just as for the Tatnall model, a 
“frozen” wake induced flow field is assumed. The strip model has been validated against 
wind-tunnel experimental data, during the WAVENC project. A recent study, employing a 
lifting line method, confirmed the particular (wing aspect ratio related) correction term for 
effective section lift coefficient used in Tatnalls and in the strip method. Application of the 
strip model to dynamic wake intercept flight test data from S-Wake suggests that the frozen 
field assumption and the empirical effective lift curve slope approximation (strictly only valid 
for stationary encounters) are still a reasonable approximation. A Pilot Response Model 
provides roll-control inputs to counteract the wake induced roll motions. A crossover model 
for the aileron deflection tδ is used. This pilot model is integrated into the 5-DOF model. A 
comparison of computed maximum bank angles for the ERCR and the RAPM model, as a 
function of the initial aircraft position in the wake, is shown in Figure 26.  
 
Computed maximum bank angles with the ERCR model were also compared with maximum 
bank angles observed during wake encounter flight simulations as performed within S-Wake 
project. A fair agreement of results was noted. 
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Figure 26 – Comparison between ERCR & RAPM computed maximum roll angles 
5.3.3 Aircraft performance models 
A new element in the WAVIR methodology is the use of a mathematical model based on 
Petri Nets (PN) models to determine the aircraft flight path evolution, the functioning of the 
ATC-Wake system and interaction with pilots and controllers during ATC-Wake arrivals. At 
specified distances from the runway threshold probability distributions of separation times 
between leader and follower aircraft is determined using the PN models. To validate this new 
approach, the Petri Net (PN) model has been compared with the well known AMAAI toolset 
developed (for EUROCONTROL) for the analysis of in-trail following aircraft. The PN-model 
employs a number of simplifications: 
• Omission of the effect of turbulence on the flight path response of the aircraft; 
• Schematic modelling of speed transition profiles, based on a given speed transition 
distance, in stead of modelling a realistic aircraft speed controller. 
 
The results of a Monte Carlo simulation is visualised in Figure 27. It shows the distributions 
of the separation time and distances at 7 windows before the threshold (at the FAF, at the 
OM, and at 2000, 1000, 400, 200 and 0 m in front of the THR). It is shown that there is a 
good agreement between the results of the AMAAI and PN-simulations. At the FAF the 
results are more or less identical. The standard deviation of the calculated separation times 
and distances were analyzed as well, and appear to be are in very good agreement. 
Differences are in the order of .1 seconds (~.02 nm) between the AMAAI and PN-model. In 
general the separation as calculated by the PN-model is somewhat less as for the AMAAI 
model. Differences are in the order of 2.5 seconds (.1 nm), i.e. relatively small and are not 
expected to significantly affect the subsequent safety assessment results. Moreover, 
possible effects will be conservative, because the separations as calculated by the PN-model 
will be slightly smaller than those from the AMAAI model. 
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Figure 27 – Probability distribution of separation distances (with AMAAI and PN-model) 
 
In summary, it is shown that the simplifications made in the PN model affect the flight path 
evolution slightly. It is also shown that this in general will lead to conservative results; i.e. the 
calculated separation between aircraft during a single runway approach will be slightly 
underestimated. In terms of risk calculation this will lead to higher risk estimates. Therefore, 
the model as implemented within the Petri-Net model will provide slightly conservative risk 
estimates. It is also found that the accuracy of the Petri-Net model is in general satisfactory. 
Moreover, it was verified that the implementation of the wind model, and the relations 
between groundspeed and airspeed (true and calibrated) have been implemented correctly 
within the PN-model. Based on these observations it is concluded that the PN-model 
provides sufficiently accurate results, such that they can be reliably (and to some extent 
conservatively) applied for further risk assessment calculations in WAVIR. 
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6 Qualitative safety assessment 
6.1 Introduction 
A qualitative safety assessment has been performed to get a global overview of the risks 
associated with the proposed ATC-Wake operation for single runway arrivals, single runway 
departures and closely spaced parallel runway departures. Moreover, in this way safety 
bottlenecks are fed back to the operation designers at an early stage, and this enables 
further focussing in the safety modelling activities and quantitative safety assessment that 
are also planned within this work package. In line with the ATC-Wake operation, the 
assessment is restricted to the following sub-operations: 
• end of cruise to final approach; 
• arrivals to single runway; 
• arrivals to closely spaced parallel runways; and 
• departures from single runway. 
 
The assessment has been limited to the risks air traffic participants are running, and for 
which air traffic control bears responsibility. This for instance excludes risks experienced by 
people living on the ground, or risks not related to ATC. The assessment did not only 
concern wake vortex risks; also other risks (as for instance collision risk) related to ATC-
Wake aspects of the operation were considered. 
6.2 Identification and evaluation of hazards and conflict scenarios 
In various brainstorming sessions with operational experts, hazards have been identified that 
could occur in the considered operation. After the identification of hazards, these hazards 
have been structured into conflict scenarios, which describe all relevant ways how these 
hazards may lead to conflicts or worsen them. The conflict scenarios are: 
I. Wake vortex encounter during departure 
II. Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival 
III. Missed approach during single runway arrival 
IV. Wake vortex encounter before ILS interception 
V. Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on closely spaced parallel runway 
VI. Missed approach during arrivals on closely spaced parallel runways 
VII. Higher traffic rates in TMA, holding, sector, or on runway 
VIII. Turbulence 
IX. More landings in crosswind 
X. Transitions between ICAO and ATC-Wake separation mode 
XI. Effects on ICAO separation mode 
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Not all scenarios apply to each of the three operations: Single runway departure, single 
runway arrival, closely spaced parallel runway arrival. For single runway departures, only 
conflict scenario I does apply. Scenarios II, III, and IV specifically apply to the single runway 
arrival operation. Scenarios V and VI specifically apply to the closely spaced parallel runway 
operation. Each scenario is constructed from several events or clusters of events, where 
each event represents a set of identified hazards. The eleven conflict scenarios and the 
results from the analysis are presented in the following pages. 
 
Conflict scenarios for single runway departures 
I Wake vortex encounter during departure 
This scenario may arise in case of the joint occurrence of a wake vortex of a leading aircraft 
and a separation that is too small to avoid the wake. The latter may be caused either by the 
combination of an aircraft taking off too early and no rejected take-off or other avoiding action 
taking place, or by a sudden (unpredictable) change of the wake behaviour. Three causes for 
an early take off have been identified: 
• The pilot of the following aircraft initiates take-off without the appropriate clearance; 
• The ATCo does not comply with the prescribed spacing and gives a clearance while he 
or she should not, and the pilot accepts this clearance; and 
• The prescribed spacing is insufficient and the ATC-Wake Detection, Warning, and 
Avoidance system does not function. 
 
For departures, it is most efficient to postpone the departure in case the wind nowcasting 
information timely indicates a sudden change of the wind. After initiation of the take-off, the 
wake representation on the ATCo’s screen may help the ATCo in informing the pilot to 
prepare for a potential encounter (he/she may then be able to control an encounter). 
 
Conflict scenarios for single runway arrivals 
For the conflict scenarios for single runway arrivals, distinction is made between the phase of 
flight before ILS interception and from interception until touchdown. Important reason for this 
is that there is no wake vortex detection foreseen in the phase before ILS interception, i.e. 
the ATC-Wake detection, warning, and avoidance system does not function here. Other 
differences as the height of the encounter may effect the consequences, but do not play a 
role in the structure of the scenario. The issue of a wake vortex encounter in the two phases 
is covered in conflict scenarios II and IV. In the last phase of an arrival, a missed approach 
may be initiated for various reasons among which a warning of the ATC-Wake detection, 
warning, and avoidance system. In case this occurs during ATC-Wake mode of operation, it 
may have different consequences than in ICAO mode and is therefore covered in a separate 
conflict scenario (III). 
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II Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival 
A wake vortex encounter may occur in case of: 
• a sudden (unpredictable) change of the wake behaviour, or 
• insufficient spacing and the ATC-Wake DWA system fails. 
 
Reasons for insufficient spacing are: 
• the ATCo does not comply with prescribed spacing, or 
• the pilot does not comply with instructions, or 
• the prescribed spacing is insufficient. 
 
The ATC-Wake detection, warning, and avoidance system consists of a technical detection 
system that can issue a warning to the ATCo, who on his/her turn can warn and/or instruct 
the pilot. Then it is the pilots responsibility to initiate appropriate actions. 
III Missed approach during single runway arrival 
The initiation of a missed approached is considered here as a separate conflict scenario (III), 
as its consequences may be different in ATC-Wake mode. A missed approach can be 
caused by insufficient spacing in combination with the presence of a wake vortex and a 
successful ATC-Wake detection, warning, and avoidance system. Besides evading a wake 
vortex, there might be other reasons to initiate a missed approach, for example a runway that 
has not been vacated yet by the preceding aircraft. Both the ATCo and the pilot can initiate a 
missed approach in such cases. Insufficient spacing results from the same causes as in 
conflict scenario II. The consequences of the missed approach do depend on the initiation 
point of the missed approach, other traffic e.g. due to a second missed approach, and 
communication between ATCo and pilot or in between ATCos.  
IV Wake vortex encounter before ILS interception 
Obviously there is some similarity between conflict scenario IV and conflict scenario II, in 
which the wake vortex encounter takes place later. Most striking difference is that the 
separation distance is not so strictly defined for this part, and that wake vortex detection and 
monitoring does not take place in the piece of airspace under consideration. Additionally, 
consecutive aircraft do not necessarily follow the same path, and aircraft speeds are higher. 
Furthermore, segregation in case of closely spaced parallel runway arrivals may contribute to 
an increased wake vortex risk. The central event in this conflict scenario is the wake vortex 
encounter that is caused by the presence of a wake vortex of another aircraft and a 
separation that is too short to avoid a wake vortex encounter. In addition to the causes for 
too short separation mentioned in scenario II (ATCo applies insufficient spacing  or pilot does 
not comply with ATC instructions and reduces spacing), vertical deviation may also be a 
cause here. The resolution variables playing a role are all similar to the ones considered in 
conflict scenario II.  
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Conflict scenarios for CSPR arrivals 
During arrivals on closely spaced parallel runways, the same types of hazards and conflict 
scenarios are considered as for arrivals on a single runway. This has simplified the further 
analysis as only the differences of the CSPR arrivals in comparison to the single runway 
arrivals have to be considered. Accordingly, the conflict scenarios are: 
V Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on closely spaced parallel runways 
With respect to wake vortex encounters during approaches on CSPRs, three cases have 
been distinguished:  
1. An aircraft encounters the wake vortex of the preceding aircraft on the same runway. 
2. An aircraft on the downwind runway encounters the wake of the preceding aircraft on the 
upwind runway. 
3. An aircraft on the upwind runway encounters the wake of the preceding aircraft on the 
downwind runway.  
 
There are few additional hazards that specifically apply to this conflict scenario. These 
concern the possibility of a wake vortex that is blown to the parallel runway, erroneous 
segregation by the ATCO due to misidentification or confusion of aircraft types, and 
erroneous swing-overs, lateral deviation of the aircraft to the parallel runway. 
VI Missed approach during arrivals on closely spaced parallel runways 
In case the ATC-Wake operation takes place on two (closely spaced) parallel runways not 
only the occurrence of a single missed approach but also of two simultaneous missed 
approaches have to be considered. There is one major difference with single runway 
operations: in case of closely spaced parallel approaches, missed approaches caused by an 
un-vacated runway will hardly occur, since the effective separation distance between two 
aircraft landing on the same runway will namely be more. An issue to be considered is 
potential collision risk between aircraft approaching the adjacent runways. 
 
Other conflict scenarios 
The conflict scenarios defined until so far specifically treated conflicts that take place in the 
ATC-Wake separation mode. In the remaining conflict scenarios VII to XI this is not 
necessarily the case. It is noted that the hazards considered in these conflict scenarios 
mostly represent side-effects of the operation under consideration. Though some of these 
side effects may also play a role in the conflict scenarios already considered, it appears 
justified to take a separate look at these aspects, to make sure that the consequences of 
these effects are not overlooked.  
VII Higher traffic rates in TMA, holding, sector, or on runway 
In conflict scenario VII, the main issue is formed by the higher traffic rates. Various hazards 
have been identified which have in common that they treat or may lead to higher traffic rates 
ATC-WAKE D3_9, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
 
46 
 
 
in the TMA, a holding, a sector, or on the runway. As possible consequences have been 
identified: an increased workload, an increased collision risk in the air, frequency congestion, 
other alerts, and an increased collision risk on the runway. The conflict scenario can occur 
both during ATC-Wake mode and during ICAO-Wake mode.  
VIII Turbulence 
Conflict scenario VIII deals with the possibility that pilots may erroneously consider ‘normal’ 
turbulence as being wake vortex turbulence. It is unclear what the reaction will be.  
IX More landings in crosswind 
Reduced separation distances may be applied in crosswind conditions because of the ATC-
Wake operation; this may lead to more landings taking place with larger crosswind.  
X Transitions between ICAO and ATC-Wake separation mode 
The transitions between the ICAO and the ATC-Wake separation mode are mentioned as a 
possible cause for higher traffic rates and consequently much communication may be 
necessary in these cases. However it is also possible that these transitions have other 
consequences, such as for ATFM.  
XI Effects on ICAO separation mode 
Even in ICAO mode, the separation applied may occasionally be too short for an ATC-Wake 
related cause. Relevant hazards identified are that a pilot or ATCo is confused about the 
active wake separation mode. Another difference with the current operations is that the 
controllers may use the ATC-Wake tools in the ICAO mode. 
6.3 Effect of failures of the ATC-Wake System Components 
Table 10 provides an assessment of the effect of the main system failures. The individual 
classifications are based on the assumption that other failure conditions do not occur. A 
simultaneous failure of two system components could aggravate the situation. 
 
Table 10 – Effect of main ATC-Wake DWA conditions 
Description Effect Classification Comment 
Pilot/aircraft not able to turn 
timely  
The pilot/aircraft is not able to 
timely perform the DWA 
manoeuvre, after it is requested 
by the controller. This could occur 
in case of a warning when the 
aircraft is still in initial take off, ie 
limitations in bank angle  apply 
An unfavourable change of 
weather (not enough crosswind) 
is passed on by the controller to 
the pilot. The pilot is prepared for 
a potential severe Wake 
encounter, and may be able to 
control the situation. 
Nevertheless, control problems 
could still occur. 
MAJOR - 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
A Wake is stronger 
closer to the generating 
aircraft. An encounter 
with reduced separation 
will result in more 
severe consequence 
than in ICAO Mode. The 
pilot is prepared for a 
WV. 
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Description Effect Classification Comment 
Controller does not provide a 
timely warning to the pilot 
The controller does not provide a 
timely warning to the pilot, for 
example because he does not 
hear an aural warning or misses a 
visual warning. ATC-Wake 
provides an alert, but ATCo is not 
aware of it and does not ask the 
pilot to initiate a turn 
An unfavourable change of 
weather (not enough crosswind) 
is not passed on to the pilot. The 
pilot will be unprepared for severe 
turbulence, i.e might experience 
control problems in close 
proximity to the ground. 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
The Wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with reduced 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations.  
Faulty or Inaccurate Separation 
Mode Planner Advise 
The advise provided by a 
Separation Mode Planner is 
wrong or inaccurate. The ATC 
supervisor, not being aware of it, 
might decide to implement ATC-
Wake Mode, with reduced 
separation although the weather 
conditions are not favourable 
(e.g. no crosswind). 
There will be an alert for (nearly) 
every aircraft departing or 
arriving, resulting in a high rate of 
initiated Wake vortex avoidance 
instructions (e.g. missed 
approaches during arrivals). The 
ATC workload increases, and 
Most likely a transition will be 
made very quickly to the ICAO 
Separation Mode. 
SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
It could take a few 
minutes before the 
transition to ICAO Mode 
is made  
Loss of Wake Vortex DWA 
Tactical Function 
The ATC-Wake Monitoring and 
Alerting system is not operational 
and provides no function. The 
controllers, not being aware of it, 
are expecting the system to warn 
in case of a discrepancy between 
prediction & detection 
information. 
The controllers will not receive an 
alert in case ATC-Wake 
separation is no longer suitable. 
The aircraft may encounter 
severe turbulence which may 
lead to control problems in close 
proximity to the ground. 
 
 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
The Wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with reduced 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO 
separations. 
Faulty or Inaccurate WV Model 
Estimation 
The predictions of Wake vortex 
locations and/or strengths made 
by the WV Model, on the basis of 
aircraft data and meteo data are 
inaccurate/wrong.  
Incorrect information is passed to 
the ATC-Wake Predictor, causing 
improper functioning. The 
predicted Wake Vortex Vector will 
be wrong, and an alert might be 
generated on the basis of false 
information. There will be an 
increase of workload. 
 
SIGNIFICANT - 
MAJOR INCIDENT 
Alert is generated 
because there is a 
discrepancy between 
prediction and detection 
information. This is 
unlikely to occur at low 
altitudes if Meteo 
Nowcast and Predictor 
are working. 
Faulty or Inaccurate Air Traffic 
Situation 
The air traffic situation provided 
by the surveillance systems is 
wrong or inaccurate. The 
controllers will most likely not be 
aware that the wrong leader or 
aircraft data is used in the ATC-
Wake Predictor and on the HMI. 
Incorrect information is passed to 
the ATC-Wake Predictor, causing 
improper functioning. The 
predicted Wake Vortex Vector will 
be wrong, and an alert might be 
generated on the basis of false 
information. Most likely a 
transition will be made to the 
ICAO Separation Mode. There 
will be an increase of workload of 
ATC. 
SIGNIFICANT  
INCIDENT 
The ATC-Wake 
separation Mode is 
based on a worst case 
combination of a Heavy 
leader aircraft and a 
Light follower aircraft.  
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Description Effect Classification Comment 
Faulty or Inaccurate Meteo 
Now-casting Information 
The nowcasted meteorological 
conditions are inaccurate or 
wrong. The controllers will most 
likely not be aware of a sudden 
unfavourable change of the wind.  
Incorrect information is passed to 
the ATC-Wake Predictor, causing 
improper functioning. The 
predicted Wake vortex transport 
is wrong. An unfavourable 
change of weather (not enough 
crosswind) is not detected. The 
aircraft may encounter severe 
turbulence, which may lead to 
control problems in close 
proximity to ground 
SERIOUS 
INCIDENT 
The Wake vortex is 
stronger closer to the 
generating aircraft. An 
encounter with reduced 
separation will result in 
more severe 
consequence than 
under ICAO separation. 
Wake Vortex outside Detection 
Range and/or Scanning Volume 
The Wake vortices generated by 
the leader aircraft are not 
detected, when they are outside 
the scanning volume of the ATC-
Wake Detector. As the WV 
detection information suddenly 
disappears, there is an indication 
and ATCos will be informed of the 
failure. 
No Wake vortex information is 
passed to the ATC-Wake 
Detector, causing improper 
functioning. As the ATC 
supervisor and the air traffic 
controllers will likely become 
aware quickly that there will not 
be an alert, a transition will be 
made to the ICAO Separation 
Mode. There will be an increase 
of workload of ATC. 
 
SIGNIFICANT 
INCIDENT 
It could take a few 
minutes before the 
transition to ICAO Mode 
is made.  
Faulty or Inaccurate Detection 
of the Wake Vortices 
The Wake vortices generated by 
the leader aircraft are 
inaccurately or not detected, 
because of a failure of the ATC-
Wake Detector. 
Incorrect information is used by 
ATC-Wake Detector, causing 
improper functioning. Wake 
Vortices are not detected. There 
will be an alert if the Wake Vortex 
Vector generated by the ATC-
Wake Predictor indicates a 
potential Wake encounter. There 
will then be an increase of 
workload. 
SIGNICANT  - 
MAJOR INCIDENT 
Alert is generated 
because there is a 
discrepancy between 
prediction and detection 
information. This is 
unlikely to occur at low 
altitudes if Meteo 
Nowcast and Predictor 
are working. 
 
According to ESARR4, failure conditions with severe consequences must be extremely 
improbable, and minor failure conditions may be probable. It is noted that a simultaneous 
failure of two main system components may aggravate the situation. 
6.4 Risk assessment per conflict scenario 
Using operational experts’ judgement and knowledge from other studies, for each of the 
eleven conflict scenarios the severity and the frequency have been assessed. Using the risk 
criteria developed in Section 3, an evaluation of the acceptability of the risk of each scenario 
was given. Table 11 provides all identified conflict scenarios and indicates for which 
scenarios potential SAFETY BOTTLENECKS exist (i.e. safety objectives may need to be 
determined. For all conflict scenarios with potential UNACCEPTABLE risks, it could not be 
ruled out that the risk also potentially is TOLERABLE or NEGLIGIBLE.  
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Table 11 – Overview of potential SAFETY BOTTLENECKS for the conflict scenarios  
Potential SAFETY BOTTLENECK in the 
ATC-Wake operation 
Conflict scenario 
Single 
runway 
departure 
Single 
runway 
arrival 
CSPR 
arrival 
I. Wake vortex encounter during departure Yes NA NA 
II. Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival NA Yes NA 
III. Missed approach during single runway arrival NA No NA 
IV. Wake vortex encounter before ILS interception NA No No 
V. Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on CSPRs NA NA Yes 
VI. Missed approach during arrivals on CSPRs NA NA No 
VII. Higher traffic rates in TMA, holding, sector, or on 
runway 
Yes Yes Yes 
VIII. Turbulence No No No 
IX. More landings in crosswind NA Yes* Yes* 
X. Transitions between ICAO & ATC-Wake separation 
mode 
Yes* Yes* Yes* 
XI. Effects on ICAO separation mode Yes* Yes* Yes* 
* The risk tolerability of these conflict scenarios could not be assessed in detail. 
6.5 Identification of safety bottlenecks 
The possibility of UNACCEPTABLE risk could not be ruled out in the conflict scenarios I, II, 
V, VII, IX, X and XI. This is potentially caused by so-called safety bottlenecks: hazards which 
cause the conflict scenario to have a risk that might be UNACCEPTABLE. The safety 
bottlenecks in the concerned conflict scenarios are discussed next. 
In conflict scenario I (Wake vortex encounter during departure), identified potential safety 
bottlenecks are: 
• Supervisors may not follow the advice of the ATC-Wake Separation Mode Planner and 
tend to deviate to the unsafe side, for example for efficiency reasons; 
• Controllers may not comply with the prescribed separation and give a take-off clearance 
too early, for instance due to a timing error; 
• Controllers may not pay sufficient attention to the visualisation tool and react properly on 
an alert, because TWR controllers are used to work based on their outside view, 
specifically in VMC. 
 
In the departure operation the risk is mainly expected in the area just after lift-off, though also 
the area around the first turn may bear a significant risk. 
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In conflict scenario II (Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival), an identified 
potential safety bottleneck is: 
• Controllers may use the wake vortex visualisation system as a separation tool (although 
this is not the objective of the tool), possibly leading to insufficient spacing. 
 
It is expected that the highest risk occurs on the final approach (from 4Nm to threshold) while 
the area where the ILS intercept takes place is also prone to wake encounters. 
 
Conflict scenario V (Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on closely spaced parallel 
runway) is expected to be less safety critical than conflict scenario II. Identified potential 
safety bottlenecks are: 
• Controllers may use the wake vortex visualisation system as a separation tool (although 
this is not the objective of the tool), possibly leading to insufficient spacing; 
• The use of a single controller for the two runways. 
 
In conflict scenario VII (Higher traffic rates in TMA), holding, sector or on runway, identified 
potential safety bottlenecks are:  
• Frequency congestion due to the expected increase in R/T load. This increase is 
expected firstly because of the additional information that needs to be given to the pilots, 
and secondly to the increase in traffic rates that is expected.  
• Collision risk on the runway, because of the application of reduced separation criteria to 
all pairs of aircraft, irrespective of the aircraft types. If the ATC-Wake mode separation 
distance does not sufficiently take into account the runway occupancy time of Heavy 
aircraft, this is expected to lead to an increased collision risk on the runway. If the ATC-
Wake mode separation distance would safely account for the runway occupancy time of 
Heavy aircraft, then the use of this separation distance for all aircraft types is not 
expected to support the capacity increase envisioned by the ATC-Wake operation. 
 
In conflict scenario IX (More landings in crosswind) a potential safety bottleneck is: 
• Adapted runway selection criteria may favour landing in crosswinds of 10 to 15 knots and 
higher above landing in headwind. 
 
In conflict scenario X (Transitions between ICAO and ATC-Wake separation mode) potential 
safety bottlenecks are: 
• Too frequent or sudden mode transitions;  
• Too much information exchange in a transition.  
 
In conflict scenario XI (Effects on ICAO separation mode) a potential safety bottleneck is: 
• The possible use of the ATC-Wake visualisation system as a separation tool. This may 
be the case if the system is available to the controllers in the ICAO separation mode. 
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For the other scenarios no UNACCEPTABLE risks were identified. These scenarios are: 
III. Missed approach during single runway arrival 
IV. Wake vortex encounter before ILS interception 
VI. Missed approach during arrivals on closely spaced parallel runways 
VIII. Turbulence 
6.6 Enhancements of the ATC-Wake operation 
Comments and recommendations on elements related to the ATC-Wake operation were 
given by some operational and safety experts in the review of this study. These may be 
valuable for the further design and implementation of the ATC-Wake operation as they may 
contribute to the resolution or mitigation of the potential safety bottlenecks.  
 
The hazard identification and the analysis of hazards and conflict scenarios have however 
been performed for an operation in which these aspects were not (yet) present. Since for 
these aspects it was not straightforward to identify whether they would introduce any new 
hazards to the operation, they have not been taken into account in this assessment. These 
aspects are summarized below: 
• In addition to the assumption that airborne equipment for wake vortex detection, such as 
the I-Wake system, may in future function as a safety-net to the ATC-Wake system, it is 
remarked that such an I-Wake system would not be considered as a potential mitigation 
mean in a future safety assessment but would act as a last safety resort. 
• In view of the atmospheric conditions for which one of the two envisaged separation 
modes (ICAO Mode or ATC-Wake Mode) must be used, it is strongly recommended to 
focus the further elaboration of weather classes on atmospheric conditions that are 
relatively easy to forecast (prediction of wind climatology is relatively easy, whereas 
atmospheric turbulence and stratification are difficult to forecast). 
• In view of the visual contact between two consecutive landing aircraft that has to be 
confirmed as soon as the second aircraft intercepts ILS, as proposed in the operation, it 
is noted that this may be more important on final approach such that the following aircraft 
can see if the preceding aircraft has vacated the runway or has initiated a go-around. 
• It is very important that ATIS information also includes information on the ATC Wake 
Procedure (meteorological and visuals conditions) and the possibility that there might be 
an alert due to low separation. 
• A-SMGCS may be required as well for the ATC-Wake operation, to provide the controller 
with aircraft position and identification on a radar display. Such facility may be required as 
higher landing rates or departure rates may be expected in the ATC-Wake operation. 
• In order to safely support reduced separation, the detection information shall also have a 
high level of integrity and continuity of service in addition to accuracy. This substantiates 
the need for an ATC-wake monitoring and alerting system. 
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• In view of the information that "deviation from separation by the ATCo seems to be daily 
practice", in the training for new operations it should be explained that current practice 
operations were designed with large embedded safety buffers because of the 
uncertainties of the systems and about the raw information. Less additional buffer is 
expected on new operations that will be designed on more accurate raw data. 
• TCAS is used to estimate distances with an accuracy of about 1 NM. However, bearing 
information is only relative bearing and is very uncertain. Relative bearing must not be 
used to estimate the track of the other aircraft. This is normally part of the TCAS training 
but it should be emphasized for wake vortex training. In fact, there could be a 
requirement to have an airborne system enabling to monitor the spacing distance with the 
preceding aircraft (see also http://adsb.tc.faa.gov/WG4.htm). 
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7 Quantitative safety assessment 
7.1 Overview of the simulation scenarios 
The set up and results of the quantitative risk assessment of the ATC-Wake operation are 
obtained using the quantitative risk assessment methodology described in Section 5.2. The 
assessments have been performed for the situation without the use of an ATC-Wake system, 
and also for the proposed ATC-Wake operation. Three studies have been carried out: 
• Single runway arrivals; 
• Single runway departures 
• Closely spaced parallel runway arrivals. 
 
Basically, the scenarios that have been set up differ in: 
• Generator – follower aircraft combination; 
• Wind velocity (direction and strength); 
• Separation distance or time. 
 
These are called ‘assessment parameters’. A simulation scenario is defined by all the 
parameters and variables in the WAVIR tool-set. The main deterministic parameters and 
stochastic variables and their values in the different scenarios are presented below. 
Longitudinal positions along the flight track 
Analysis of wake induced risk is done in a number of longitudinal positions up to 10 Nm from 
the runway thresholds. From the qualitative analysis it appears that the following areas might 
be the most dangerous: the area close to the ground, the area encompassing the first turn in 
the climb phase, and the area near ILS interception. 
Wake vortex evolution model parameters 
The vortex pair behind the generator aircraft is modelled as two line vortices with a vortex 
spacing, a vortex strength, and a core-radius. These parameters do depend on the 
wingspan, weight and speed of the generator aircraft. Evolution of the vortex position is 
modelled according to Corjon & Poinsot. This includes image vortices and secondary 
vortices making the vortex pair to diverge and rebound near the ground respectively. 
Parameters concerning secondary vortices are:  
• strength of the secondary vortices as a fraction of the strength of the primary vortices; 
and the 
• rebound height 
A secondary vortex appears as soon as the primary vortex has decreased to a certain 
altitude: the rebound height. For the rebound height a fixed value of 0.6b0 will be used. The 
strength of the secondary vortex is a fraction of the strength of the primary vortex. This 
fraction is drawn from an uniform distribution between 0.3 and 0.7.  
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Decay model 
The decay function as defined by Sarpkaya will be used. Input parameters are the Brunt-
Väisälä frequency N and the Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR).  
Meteorological input parameters 
• Brunt-Väisälä frequency (N) 
• Eddy Dissipation Rate (EDR) 
 
Simulations have been performed for a two-dimensional data set of Brunt-Väisälä 
frequencies and EDR values representing the climatology of London Heathrow at different 
height levels. Information on this climatology was provided by UKMO. 
 
 
Figure 28 – Frequency distributions of EDR and N2 for the Heathrow climatology 
Wind input parameters 
• Wind velocity   
• Altitude of measurement 
• Roughness coefficient  
 
Wind will be simulated assuming a logarithmic wind profile up to an altitude of 1000ft. Above 
this altitude the wind is constant. The surface roughness is 0.03m which is representative for 
an airport environment. The wind value is specified at 10m altitude. For determination of the 
minimum crosswind value, above which the separation distance (or time) for all aircraft 
combinations can be reduced safely, the focus will be on varying the crosswind velocity and 
analysing the impact on risk accordingly. To assess the wake vortex induced risk at a generic 
airport, a second assessment could be performed, where the total wind vector is specified by 
a cumulative distribution for the probability of exceeding a given wind speed (according to 
JAR-AWO (ACJ AWO 131)). 
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Wake encounter model parameters 
Two encounter models are available, the Extended Roll Control Ratio model (ERCR) and the 
Reduced Aircraft Pilot Model (RAPM). The aircraft dependent parameters that are required 
by the ERCR and RAPM model are determined for a number of generic aircraft types. In the 
current study, the ERCR has been applied to compute the roll control ratio and the maximum 
bank angle. The RAPM was used to verify and calibrate the ERCR model. An encounter 
severity classification scheme based on maximum bank angle and altitude of encounter is 
available from S-Wake.  
Risk prediction model parameters 
To obtain incident/accident probabilities for a given time separation between leader and 
follower aircraft, the risk prediction model developed within S-Wake is used. This model 
includes a definition of risk events (Minor Incident, Major Incident, Hazardous Accident and 
Catastrophic Accident), a probability transition matrix from encounter severity classes to risk 
events, and the associated risk requirements (Target Level of Safety). 
7.2 Single runway arrivals 
 
7.2.1 Set up of the simulation scenarios 
For the analysis of the current practice situation, the generic scenario considers the final 
approach of a leader and follower aircraft, both descending along the ILS path from final 
approach point (FAP) to runway threshold (THR). The calibrated air speed of the aircraft is 
independent of aircraft type between FAP and the outer marker (OM), and decelerates to the 
final approach speed between OM and deceleration point (DP). The aircraft considered are 
shown in Table 12. This approach is consistent with the approach followed in S-Wake. 
 
Table 12 – Aircraft types for single runway arrivals 
# Name ICAO
 CAT
 
A
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n
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ach
 [kg]
 
W
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 [m]
 
FAS
 [kts]
 
1 Large jumbo jet H 245000 60.0 150 
2 Wide body jet H 130000 45.2 135 
3 Medium jet M 60000 36.0 138 
4 Regional jet M 34000 30.0 128 
5 Medium turbo prop M 20000 30.0 106 
6 Light turbo prop L 4000 14.0 100 
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Depending on the wind conditions, the approach operation can be performed in ATC-Wake 
mode, which implies that all aircraft are to be separated at a constant distance at the runway 
threshold. The aircraft are assumed to follow a 3 degrees glide path from ILS glide path 
intercept to touchdown. The lateral and vertical deviation from the nominal flight path is 
based on the ICAO-CRM. Nominal aircraft speed profiles are specified by: 
• the airport dependent speed at the Outer Marker (OM) that is prescribed by ATC; 
• from OM to the Deceleration Point (DP), the speed is linearly decreasing to the aircraft 
dependent Final Approach Speed (FAS); 
• from DP until touchdown, aircraft dependent speed is constant and equal to the FAS. 
 
 
Figure 29 – Nominal approach speed profiles 
For the analysis of the situation with the ATC-Wake system in use, the generic scenario follows 
from Monte Carlo simulations with the newly developed and validated Petri-Net approach 
model (see Section 5.3.3) with a large jumbo jet as leader and a medium turbo prop as follower 
aircraft. Here, the purpose is to determine the conditions under which reduced separation with 
the proposed ATC-Wake mode separation of 2.5 Nm is feasible in terms of acceptable wake 
vortex risk and acceptable missed approach rate. 
7.2.2 Overview of main results from the current practice simulations 
The detailed results of the quantitative safety assessment of the current practice are given in 
Appendix A, and visualized in Figure 30. A Large jumbo jet and Medium jet as Leader 
AirCraft (LAC) were combined with Large jumbo jet, Medium jet, Regional jet, and Light turbo 
prop as Follower AirCraft (FAC). Crosswind was varied between 0, 1, 2, and 4 m/s at 10m 
altitude, assuming a logarithmic profile with height. Evaluated separation distances, 
controlled at the runway threshold were 3.0, 4.0, and 5.0NM.  
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Figure 30 – Overview of WAVIR assessed safe separation minima for the SRA operation 
 
Taking into consideration that ATC-Wake reduced separation should be applied to all aircraft 
combinations and that because of radar separation criteria 2.5NM is currently the minimum 
spacing, Table 13 indicates safe separation minima for the assessed operation for certain 
crosswind intervals. Please note that these are indicative numbers that do not take into 
account uncertainty in the crosswind conditions, safety margins and other factors that may 
influence safety. Also, it is assumed that these separations may only be applied in case the 
ATC-Wake system (and operation) is used, and the system components meet certain 
performance requirements which follow from Section 7.2.3. 
 
Table 13 – Indicative separation per crosswind interval for single runway arrivals 
 
Proposed separation (the largest value in a row applies) 
Crosswind 
interval 
Wake vortex induced 
separation minima 
Radar separation 
minima 
Runway Occupancy time 
(ROT) minima 
uc ≤ 2 m/s ICAO 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 2.5 NM 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent  
4 m/s ≤ uc 2.0 NM 2.5 NM aircraft/runway dependent  
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7.2.3 Requirements setting for ATC-Wake operation with 2.5 Nm separation 
To support the identification of a set of conditions/requirements under which the ATC-Wake 
single runway arrival operation can fulfil the target levels of (wake vortex) safety with an 
acceptable rate of missed approaches, Table 14 shows the results for the proportion of 
approaches in the ATC-Wake mode and the missed approach rate for crosswind forecast 
threshold values of 2 and 4 m/s.  
 
Table 14 – Monte Carlo simulation results for the proportion of ATC-Wake approaches 
and the missed approach rate for minimum crosswind forecasts of 2 and 4 m/s 
Case Explanation Crosswind 
threshold (m/s) 
ATC-Wake 
mode (%) 
MA rate (%) 
2 76 20 0 Standard case 
4 47 8.4 
2 62 7.8 1a Improved accuracy of wind forecast 
4 30 0.15 
2 61 2.0 1b Perfect wind forecast 
4 28 0 
2 76 20 2a Improved accuracy FAP separation 
time  4 47 8.1 
2 76 20 2b Perfect FAP separation time 
4 47 8.1 
2 76 13 3 Improved navigation & reduced WV 
critical area boundary box 4 47 4.8 
2 76 6.3 4a Wake vortex vector divided by 2 
4 47 2.0 
2 76 1.3 4b Wake vortex vector divided by 4 
4 47 0.36 
 
A number of observations can be made on the basis of Table 14: 
• A crosswind forecast threshold value for the ATC-Wake separation mode planner of 2 
m/s leads in all cases to missed approach rates of more than 0.2%. Although such a 
small crosswind threshold value would enable a large proportion (61 to 76%) of the 
approaches to be performed in the ATC-Wake mode, the small crosswinds would lead to 
large number of events in which the follower enters the wake vortex critical area of the 
leader, resulting in ATC-Wake alerts and subsequent missed approach operations. 
• A crosswind forecast threshold value for the ATC-Wake separation mode planner of 4 
m/s may lead to acceptable missed approach rates, depending on other operational 
factors. With this threshold value, about 28 to 47% of the approaches are performed in 
the ATC-Wake mode. 
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• The accuracy of the wind forecast has a strong effect on the missed approach rate. 
Improved accuracy (case 1a) can imply 0.15% missed approaches; a perfect wind 
forecast (case 1b) would imply that no missed approaches due to ATC-Wake alerts 
occur. The reason is that as a result of the better wind forecast the likelihood of having 
approaches in conditions with small crosswind values (e.g., 0 to 2 m/s) whereas the 
crosswind is expected to be more than 4 m/s, is strongly (or even completely) reduced.  
• The uncertainty in the arrival time at the final approach point has almost no effect on the 
missed approach rate (cases 2a and 2b). The explanation is that the effect of the 
inaccuracy of the crosswind forecast by far dominates the likelihood of an ATC-Wake 
alert. For instance, the event in which the actual crosswind is only 1 m/s whereas it 
should be at least 4 m/s implies an increase in the length of the wake vortex by a factor 4. 
Near the final approach point this can lead to an increase in the length of the wake vortex 
vector of 6 km from about 2 km (with 4 m/s crosswind) to 8 km (with 1 m/s crosswind). In 
contrast, a significant change of 20 s in the separation time at the FAP implies a change 
in separation distance of less than 2 km. 
• An improved navigation performance in combination with a smaller wake vortex critical 
boundary box (case 3) leads to halving of the missed approach rate (for a crosswind 
threshold of 4 m/s). This is due to the reduction of the wake vortex critical boundary box. 
• Reductions in the length of the wake vortex vector (cases 4a and 4b) lead to more than 
proportional reductions in the missed approach rate. 
Subsequently, for cases 0, 1a, 2b, 3 and 4b, the wake vortex risk is evaluated by the WAVIR 
toolbox (see Table 15). Details of the evaluation are gathered in ATC-Wake D3_6A. 
 
Table 15 – Wake vortex encounter probabilities. Mean and maximum risk: average and 
maximum of instantaneous risk over trajectory from FAP to 500 m before runway 
threshold respectively. The crosswind threshold for use of ATC-Wake mode is 4 m/s 
Probability per wake vortex severity class Case Risk 
Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic 
TLS Mean 5.00E-04 1.00E-05 3.00E-07 9.00E-09 
Mean 1.15E-04 9.27E-06 1.64E-06 2.05E-09 0 
Maximum 7.18E-04 6.55E-05 1.12E-05 1.29E-08 
Mean 3.65E-05 3.28E-06 6.86E-07 6.53E-10 1a 
Maximum 2.70E-04 2.47E-05 4.80E-06 4.86E-09 
Mean 1.24E-04 9.27E-06 1.36E-06 2.22E-09 2b 
Maximum 7.67E-04 6.46E-05 1.09E-05 1.38E-08 
Mean 1.51E-04 1.10E-05 1.73E-06 2.67E-09 3 
Maximum 6.20E-04 5.72E-05 1.03E-05 1.12E-08 
Mean 1.02E-03 6.42E-05 7.59E-06 1.70E-08 4b 
Maximum 9.00E-03 4.18E-04 4.44E-05 1.62E-07 
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The simulations also indicate that, provided that certain requirements are met, about 30% of 
the approaches might be performed with 2.5 Nm aircraft separation in case ATC-Wake is 
used. The model results show that a sufficiently accurate prediction of the (cross)wind is a 
sine qua non for the feasibility of the ATC-Wake operation. If the accuracy of the wind 
forecast is too low, an unacceptably large number of approaches may be initiated in ATC-
Wake mode with reduced separation, since the actual crosswind might become smaller than 
required. The model results show that risk of wake vortex encounters can be reduced quite 
effectively by the ATC-Wake wake vortex prediction and detection systems and the 
corresponding alerts provided by the controller to the pilots. However, risk reduction is 
achieved at the cost of a relatively large number of missed approaches.  
 
Based on the analysis, the bottom line for achieving a separation criterion of 2.5 NM in the 
ATC-Wake mode is a sufficiently accurate prediction of the crosswind during the approach. 
This implies that the wind forecast error may not have a bias and the standard deviation of 
the wind forecast error must be no more than 1.0 m/s. Stated differently, the 95% wind 
forecast accuracy must then be within 2.0 m/s. This means that the performance of the ATC-
Wake Meteorological Forecast system, which has an error near the ground level with a bias 
of about 1.0 m/s and with a standard deviation of about 1.7 m/s, should be improved. In 
addition to the improvement of the accuracy of the wind forecast, other requirements that 
follow from the optimised setting of the ATC-Wake operation are: 
• The lateral angle of the wake vortex critical boundary box should be 0.14 degrees. This 
parameter is a straightforward system setting in the ATC-Wake system. 
• The (standard deviation of the) lateral deviations from the ILS during the final approach 
should be halved with respect to the lateral deviations in the ICAO CRM model [13]. Such 
an improvement in navigation performance may be supported by continuing 
developments in navigation systems. 
7.3 Single runway departures 
 
7.3.1 Set up of the simulation scenarios 
Table 16 gives an overview of how the assessment parameters have been changed over the 
simulations. See section 7.1 for the leading- and follower aircraft designators. In total, 540 
scenarios have been assessed. To determine the minimum crosswind value, above which 
the separation time for all aircraft combinations can be reduced safely to 90 s, the crosswind 
is varied between 0 and 5 m/s. Eight generic aircraft types have been defined. Some of their 
characteristic parameters have been derived from the Eurocontrol Base of Aircraft Data (see 
Table 17). Three different aircraft in the Heavy and Medium class will be simulated as 
generator aircraft: a Large jumbo jet, a Wide Body Jet and a Medium jet. Four different 
follower aircraft will be considered: a Large jumbo jet, a Regional jet, a Medium turbo prop, 
and a Light Business Jet.  
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Table 16 – Assessment parameters for the SRD operation 
1 through 96 97 through 192 193 through 288
Leading A/C LAC1 LAC3 LAC4
Follower A/C FAC1, 5, 6, 7 FAC1, 5, 6, 7 FAC1, 5, 6, 7
Lift Off Point LAC Early, Late Early, Late Early, Late
Lift Off Point FAC Early, Late Early, Late Early, Late
(Cross)wind [m/s] 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Separation [s] 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 60, 90, 120, 150, 180 60, 90, 120, 150, 180
Assessment Scenarios
A
ss
es
s
m
en
t 
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
 
 
Table 17 – Aircraft characteristics (derived from the Eurocontrol BADA, Revision 3.6) 
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1 Large jumbo jet H 372000 300000 60 186 140 149 
2 Wide body jet H 287000 208700 60 157 117 125 
3 Wide body jet H 181400 150000 45 164 122 136 
4 Medium jet M 68000 58000 36 168 125 131 
5 Regional jet  M 43090 38000 30 148 110 110 
6 Med turbo prop M 20820 18000 30 132 86 92 
7 Light Buss. Jet L 6025 6000 16 122 90 90 
8 Light Turbo Prop L 4700 4100 14 123 79 83 
 
Figure 31 shows the vertical profile for different types of aircraft (BADA 3.6), where the 
longitudinal axis specifies the distance of the climbing aircraft from lift off. It is assumed that 
the aircraft follow a 'nominal' climb profile, as specified in BADA 3.6, i.e. in reality the climb 
rate could be higher or lower than used. 
 
020004000600080001000012000140001600018000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
Departurepaths
Longitudinal position [m]
Ve
rtic
al p
osi
tion
 [m]
Large jumbo jet
Wide body jet
Medium jet
Regional jet
Medium turbo prop
Light turbo prop
Wide body jet (2)
Light business jet
 
Figure 31 – Vertical profiles of departing aircraft types based on the BADA database 
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These aircraft speed profiles and climb rates are generated using the Eurocontrol Base of 
Aircraft Data (BADA), which provides FAR Take Off Length, true airspeed (TAS) and rate of 
climb for a specified flight level. Combining these numbers, one can compute the height, and 
longitudinal position as a function of time for different kinds of aircraft performing a departure. 
 
The rotation points for the different aircraft types depend on several factors, including take off 
weight, engines, wind (speed and direction), air temperature and pressure, runway 
characteristics (length, gradient and humidity), and thrust settings. A derated take off, using 
the extra available length of a runway, is often applied by the pilot – at the request of airlines 
– to minimise the load on the engines (which increases their life time). In the simulation 
scenarios, the following is assumed (see also Table 18): 
• The Take Off Position (TOP) of the leader and follower are both equal to the Runway 
Threshold (i.e. the Runway Entry Point to be specified in WAVIR is equal to 0 (zero)). 
• The Minimum Lift Point of an aircraft is smaller than the Take Off Length (TOL) (from 
BADA, Revision 3.6) and estimated under the assumption of a non-derated take off. 
• The Maximum Lift Off Point of an aircraft departing at Schiphol runway 24 (with a runway 
length of 3500 m) is estimated through the use of expert opinion (D3_6B). 
 
Table 18 – Estimated lift off points of different aircraft types (at Schiphol runway 24) 
 
# 
Name Cat Take Off 
Length 
Early Lift Off Point 
(non-derated take off) 
Late Lift Off Point (e.g. using 
intersection take off or derated) 
1 LJJ H 3320 2100 3000 
2 WBJ6  H 2925 2000 2700 
3 WBJ7 H 2700 1900 2500 
4 MJ M 2500 1500 2300 
5 RJ M 1715 1200 2200 
6 MTP M 940 700 1800 
7 LBJ L 727 600 1600 
8 LTP L 506 400 1400 
7.3.2 Overview of main results from the simulations 
The full details of the quantitative safety assessment are provided in ATC-Wake D3_6B. An 
important departure specific and aircraft dependent parameter is the lift-off point. In the 
assessment a distinction has been made between early and late lift-off of the aircraft. The 
variation of lift-off points results in a variation of departure tracks. When the follower aircraft 
lifts off early behind a leader aircraft that lifts off late, the departure path of the follower 
aircraft well exceeds that of the leader aircraft, and as a consequence the associated risks 
are low. To stay on the conservative side, the risk results have been maximised over the 
variation in lift-off point before deriving the safe separation minima as presented in Figure 32. 
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Figure 32 – Overview of WAVIR assessed safe separation minima for the SRD operation 
 
The associated risk results are presented in Appendix B. The variety of flight tracks in the 
departure operation, because of differences in aircraft climb performance and lift off points, 
results in a number of interesting observations. For example, it appears that a Light business 
jet behind a Large jumbo jet might be separated with just 60s. Taking into consideration that 
ATC-Wake Mode should be applied to all aircraft combinations, Table 19 indicates safe 
separation minima for certain crosswind intervals. Please note that these are indicative 
numbers that do not take into account uncertainty in the crosswind conditions, safety margins 
and other factors that may influence safety. Also, it is assumed that these separations may 
only be applied in case the ATC-Wake system is used, and the system components meet 
certain performance requirements. Reduced separation of 90s may be applied when 
crosswind exceeds 3m/s, while 60s separation can be applied with crosswind above 5m/s. 
 
Table 19 – Indicative separation per crosswind interval for the SRD operation 
Crosswind interval Proposed wake vortex separation 
0 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 120s 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 90s 
5m/s ≤ uc 60s 
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7.4 Closely spaced parallel runways 
 
7.4.1 Set up of the simulation scenarios 
The assessment of the CSPR arrival operation has been performed for a runway lay-out with 
384m lateral spacing and no displaced threshold. Aircraft types that have been considered 
as leader are the Large jumbo jet, Wide body jet, and Medium jet while the Large jumbo jet, 
Wide body jet, Medium jet, Regional jet, Medium turbo prop, and Light turbo prop all have 
been evaluated as follower aircraft. In case of parallel runways, particularly dangerous wake 
vortex encounters may occur if the vortex is transported by the crosswind from the upwind to 
the downwind runway. To investigate those crosswind values that could be hazardous and 
those that safely allow reduced separation, crosswinds of 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9m/s have been 
evaluated. This relates to a crosswind speed at 10m altitude. A logarithmic profile with 
altitude is assumed. To analyse the wake vortex induced risk as a function of the reference 
separation distance, controlled at the runway threshold, separation has been varied between 
2.0, 2.5, 3.0, and 4.0NM. Table 20 summarises the assessment parameters. 
 
Table 20 – Assessment parameters for the CSPRA operation 
 
Assessment scenarios 
Leading Aircraft LAC1 LAC2 LAC3 
Follower Aircraft FAC1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 FAC1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 FAC1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
Crosswind [m/s] 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 
As
se
ss
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t 
pa
ra
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Separation [NM] 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 4.0 
 
The assessment of various aircraft combinations provides information for both the 
segregated CSPRA operation as proposed in the ATC-Wake concept and the more generic 
non-segregated operation.  
 
Figure 33 – Flight path corridors based on ICAO-CRM used in the CSPR assessment 
ATC-WAKE D3_9, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
 
65 
 
 
7.4.2 Summary of main results from the simulations 
For each of the evaluated scenarios the risk results are provided in Appendix C. An overview 
of the safe separation distances is shown in Figure 34. Considering non-segregated traffic, 
i.e. both Heavy and Medium aircraft may land on either runway, it appears that a crosswind 
of 1m/s is too weak to transport the vortices to the adjacent runway. A crosswind of 3 m/s is 
most critical and for most aircraft combinations the risk at all considered separation distances 
was too high compared to the risk criteria. Only for combinations of a Medium jet leader 
aircraft followed by a Large jumbo or Wide body jet the risk appears to be such low that 
reduced separation is considered safe. In case of 5m/s crosswind, WAVIR assessed 
separation varies between 2.7NM behind a Medium jet and 3.6NM behind a Large jumbo jet. 
Crosswind of more than 7m/s does enable separation reduction to 3.0NM or even lower.  
 
Figure 34 – Overview of safe separation distances for the CSPR arrival operation 
 
Taking into consideration that ATC-Wake reduced separation should be applied to all aircraft 
combinations and that because of radar separation criteria 2.5NM is minimum spacing, Table 
21 indicates safe separation minima for the assessed configuration for certain crosswind 
intervals (second column). Please note that these are indicative numbers that do not take 
into account uncertainty in the crosswind conditions, safety margins and other factors that 
may influence safety. 
 
When considering segregated traffic, i.e. Heavy aircraft (like Large jumbo jet and Wide body 
jet) are only allowed on the downwind runway, the worst case situation is when the vortices 
of a Medium aircraft (like Medium jet) on the upwind runway are encountered by a Heavy 
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aircraft (like Wide body jet) on the downwind runway. Following the results as presented in 
Figure 34, indicative separation minima then become as listed in the third column of Table 
21. A less strict segregation of traffic, indicated as 'semi-segregated', may allow Medium 
aircraft also on the downwind runway. Then, the worst case situation is when the vortices of 
a Medium aircraft (like Medium jet) on the upwind runway are encountered by a Medium 
aircraft (like Medium turbo prop) on the downwind runway and indicative separation minima 
become as listed in the fourth column of Table 21. 
 
Table 21 – Indicative separation per crosswind interval for the CSPRA operation 
 
Proposed separation 
Crosswind interval Non-segregated 
traffic 
Segregated traffic 
(Heavy only on 
downwind runway) 
Semi-segregated traffic 
(Heavy and Medium on 
downwind runway) 
0 ≤ uc ≤ 1m/s 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 4.0NM 3.0NM 3.5NM 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 3.0NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 
8m/s ≤ uc 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 
 
In all three considered cases, reduced separation may be applied for especially weak 
crosswinds (in between 0 and 1 m/s) and strong crosswinds (above 8m/s). Segregation of 
traffic enables reduced separation for all crosswinds while for semi-segregated traffic ICAO 
separation should be applied when the crosswind is in between 1 and 4m/s. Note that such 
calculated crosswind intervals strongly depend on the runway spacing. 
7.5 Overview of proposed ATC-Wake Mode separations 
Indicative separation minima have been derived for each of the 3 ATC-Wake operations, and 
indicative tables have been derived that link the prevailing crosswind speed to the separation 
to be applied in ATC-Wake Mode. The results are summarised in Table 22. The crosswind 
intervals have now been split up to bins of 1m/s width. A crosswind climatology based on 
400,000 observations at about 10 European airports has been used to determine the 
probabilities of occurrence of the crosswind interval. The data source itself is confidential. 
Crosswind from left and right appeared to be equally likely. The resulting crosswind 
probabilities listed in Table 22 give an indication about the likelihood of certain (wind) 
conditions. 
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Table 22 – Indicative separation per crosswind interval for the ATC-Wake operation 
 
Proposed separation Crosswind 
probability 
 
Crosswind 
interval 
SRD 
operation 
SRA  
operation 
CSPRA 
operation 
(non- 
segregated) 
CSPRA 
 operation 
(segregated) 
CSPRA 
operation 
(semi- 
segregated) 
Crosswind 
probability 
per 
interval 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO ICAO 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.080 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO ICAO ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.208 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 120s 2.5NM ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.206 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 90s 2.5NM ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.164 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 90s 2.5NM ICAO 3.0NM 3.5NM 0.118 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 60s 2.5NM ICAO 3.0NM 3.5NM 0.081 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 60s 2.5NM 3.0NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.053 
8m/s ≤ uc 60s 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.090 
ATC-WAKE D3_9, FINAL VERSION, 31/12/2005 
 
68 
 
 
8 Evaluation of capacity improvements 
8.1 Introduction 
The potential for the sustainable growth of air transport is inherently linked to the extent to 
which the ATM network is able to support capacity increases whilst maintaining necessary 
safety levels. An increase of capacity can be achieved via the implementation of ATC-Wake 
allowing to reduce the standard ICAO separations. Nevertheless, this may be expensive and 
a cost-benefit analysis has to figure out what is the balance between an acceptable level of 
delay and some feasible airport equipment improvements. 
8.2 Runway throughput and delay in full ICAO and ATC-Wake Mode 
A first estimation of the potential capacity improvements has been established through the 
use of analytical models based on aircraft spacing, queuing models, and sequencing 
approximation methods for the arrival and departure flows (D4_5). Table 23, 24, and 25 
respectively show departure throughput, arrival throughput, and arrival delay characteristic 
numbers in case of ICAO separation and in case of ATC-Wake separation. 
 
Table 23 – Departure throughput in case of ICAO or reduced separation (from D4_5) 
Configuration Departure Capacity (ac/h) % Change 
ICAO 37.8 0 % (reference) 
ATC-Wake mode (60s) 40.0 6.3 % 
 
Table 24 – Arrival throughput in case of ICAO or reduced separation (from D4_5) 
Configuration Arrival Capacity (ac/h) % Change 
ICAO (2.5 Nm radar separation) 35.2 0 % (reference) 
ATC-Wake mode (3.0 Nm) 37.4 6.3 % 
ATC-Wake mode (2.5 Nm) 37.7 7.1 % 
 
Table 25 – Arrival delay in case of ICAO or reduced separation (from D4_5) 
Configuration Arrival delay (min) % Change 
ICAO (2.5 Nm radar separation) 3.0 0 % (reference) 
ATC-Wake mode (3.0 Nm) 2.0 -33 % 
ATC-Wake mode (2.5 Nm) 1.8 -40 % 
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The comparison of ATC-Wake mode with ICAO operations has shown that (D4_5): 
• The arrival capacity increases significantly when changing from standard ICAO wake 
vortex separations to ATC-Wake mode separations. 
• The departure capacity increases significantly when changing from standard ICAO wake 
vortex separations to ATC-Wake mode separations. 
• The average arrival delay decreases significantly when changing from standard ICAO 
operations to ATC-Wake mode for the same demand level. 
8.3 Runway throughput and delay of the ATC-Wake SRA operation 
To derive the potential benefits of the ATC-Wake SRA operation at an airport with average 
(wind) conditions, the statistical data on the occurrence of crosswind at an airport, the ATC-
Wake SRA separation schemes as function of crosswind, and the results from the analytical 
study reported in D4_5 have been combined. The results are provided in Table 26 
(throughput) and Table 26 (expected delay). 
 
Table 26 – Expected throughput for the SRA operation 
 
SRA operation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Separation Throughput 
[ac/hr] 
Crosswind probability 
per interval 
Weighed 
throughput 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO 35.2 0.080 2.8 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO 35.2 0.208 7.3 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.206 7.8 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.164 6.2 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.118 4.4 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.081 3.1 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 2.5NM 37.7 0.053 2.0 
8m/s ≤ uc 2.5NM 37.7 0.090 3.4 
Expected throughput [ac/hr] 37.0 
Change compared to reference situation (ICAO) 5.0% 
 
Table 27 – Expected delay for the SRA operation 
 
SRA operation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Separation Delay [min] Crosswind probability 
per interval 
Weighed delay 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO 3.0 0.080 0.24 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO 3.0 0.208 0.62 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.206 0.37 
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3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.164 0.30 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.118 0.21 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.081 0.15 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 2.5NM 1.8 0.053 0.10 
8m/s ≤ uc 2.5NM 1.8 0.090 0.16 
Expected delay [min] 2.15 
Change compared to reference situation (ICAO) -28.5% 
8.4 Runway throughput and delay of the ATC-Wake SRD operation 
To derive the potential benefits of the ATC-Wake SRD operation at an airport with average 
(wind) conditions, the statistical data on the occurrence of crosswind at an airport, the ATC-
Wake SRD separation schemes as function of crosswind, and the results from the analytical 
study reported in D4_5 have been combined. Expected throughput is provided in Table 28. 
 
Table 28 – Expected throughput for the SRD operation 
 
SRD operation 
Crosswind 
interval 
Separation Throughput 
[ac/hr] 
Crosswind probability 
per interval 
Weighed 
throughput 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO 37.8 0.080 3.0 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO 37.8 0.208 7.9 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s ICAO 37.8 0.206 7.8 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 90s 38.9 0.164 6.4 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 90s 38.9 0.118 4.6 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 60s 40.0 0.081 3.2 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 60s 40.0 0.053 2.1 
8m/s ≤ uc 60s 40.0 0.090 3.6 
Expected throughput [ac/hr] 38.6 
Change compared to reference situation (ICAO) 2.1% 
8.5 Summary of the runway throughput and delay characteristics 
Table 29 provides a summary of the runway throughput and delay characteristics of the SRA, 
SRD, and CSPRA operations (note that for the latter a distinction is made between non-
segregated, segregated, and semi-segregated traffic). 
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Table 29 – Summary of runway throughput and delay characteristics 
 
Runway throughput [ac/hr] Delay [min] 
Operation ICAO ATC-Wake Change ICAO ATC-Wake Change 
SRD 37.8 38.6 +2.1% N/A N/A N/A 
SRA 35.2 37.0 +5.0% 3.0 2.15 -29% 
CSPRA (non-segr.) 35.2 35.7 +1.5% 3.0 2.74 -8.6% 
CSPRA (segregated) 35.2 37.6 +6.9% 3.0 1.84 -38.7% 
CSPRA (semi-segr.) 35.2 35.8 +1.6% 3.0 2.73 -8.9% 
 
All results are promising as already a 1 or 2% increase in runway throughput may lead to 
substantial economic benefits. The current study focused on crosswind only. Strong 
headwind conditions (as studied in Time Based Separation) is known to be beneficial as well. 
It is therefore recommended for future work to focus on elaboration of the current approach 
towards an evaluation of individual airports with their local weather conditions. 
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9 Conclusions and recommendations 
9.1 Conclusions 
With the steady increase in air traffic, civil aviation authorities are under continuous pressure 
to increase aircraft handling capacity. One potential approach is to reduce the separation 
distance between aircraft at take-off and landing without compromising safety. One major 
limiting factor is that aircraft always give each other a wide berth to avoid eachother wake 
turbulence. With the aid of smart planning techniques, however these distances can be 
safely reduced, significantly increasing airport capacity. The IST project ATC-Wake aims to 
develop and build an integrated system for ATC (Air Traffic Control) that would allow variable 
aircraft separation distances, as opposed to the fixed distances presently applied at airports. 
As motivation for the use of ATC-Wake, the potential safety and capacity improvements have 
been analyzed. It has been shown that runway throughput and delay improves 
noticeably when the ATC-Wake system is used. Depending on the occurrence of 
favourable crosswind conditions, the increase in runway throughput is about 2% for the ATC-
Wake SRD operation and 5% for the ATC-Wake SRA operation (at a generic airport with 
average wind conditions). Introduction of a new ATC system cannot be done without 
showing that minimum safety requirements are met. ATC-Wake risk assessments intend 
to be compliant with ESARR4 requirements posed by the Safety Regulation Unit (SRU) of 
EUROCONTROL. Guidelines for development of new wake vortex safety regulation have 
been given (using a Wake Vortex risk management framework developed in S-Wake). 
 
The safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operation has been performed in three steps. 
First, as part of the qualitative safety assessment, potential hazards and conflict scenarios 
related to use of ATC-Wake have been evaluated. Second, through use of the ‘classical’ 
WAVIR tool, indicative separation minima dependent on crosswind conditions have been 
determined. As these indicative separation minima do not yet account for crosswind 
uncertainty, as part of the third step, the setting of requirements for the ATC-Wake system 
components was further investigated. It appears that the especially the Monitoring and 
Alerting system and Meteorological Forecast and Now-casting systems are crucial and 
sufficient accuracy and reliability shall be guaranteed.  
 
WAVIR simulations for the SRA operation indicate that reduced separation of 2.5 Nm 
might be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode provided that crosswind is forecasted to be 
above a certain limit. During ATC-Wake arrivals, the Monitoring and Alerting component will 
anticipate potential wake encounters in time (and generate an alert); nevertheless if the 
meteorological forecast information is not accurate and stable enough, this might be 
achieved at the cost of a relatively large number of missed approaches. The simulations 
indicate that, provided that certain requirements are met, about 30% of the approaches might 
be performed with 2.5 Nm aircraft separation in case ATC-Wake is used. 
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WAVIR simulations for the SRD operation also indicate that reduced separation of 90 
seconds can be applied safely in ATC-Wake Mode, provided that crosswind is forecasted 
to be above a certain limit. If the accuracy of the wind forecast information is too low, the 
Monitoring and Alerting component could provide a relatively large number of alerts. A 
potential issue is that immediately after take off, i.e. at relatively low altitude, it will not be 
feasible for the pilot to turn away from the wake vortex of a preceding aircraft. Provision and 
use of meteorological now-casting information by the controller will be very beneficial during 
the second departure phase, in order to support the pilot to prepare for a potential encounter 
in case of a sudden change of the wind conditions. 
Qualitative safety assessment of the ATC-Wake operation 
For the operations outlined in the ATC-Wake operational concept, a qualitative safety 
assessment was performed for single runway departures, single runway arrivals and closely 
spaced parallel runway arrivals. It was concluded that for these operations there exist some 
conflict scenarios that may bear potential SAFETY BOTTLENECKS, i.e., the risk may be above a 
maximum tolerable probability. No definitive answers on the acceptability of the risks were 
attained in the qualitative safety assessment, as the results included extensive uncertainty 
bands. Therefore, the analysis was supported with a subsequent quantitative safety 
assessment with support of mathematical models for aspects of the ATC-Wake operations. 
Some safety bottlenecks have been identified, enabling adaptation and enhancements of the 
ATC-Wake operation. The scenarios are: 
• Wake vortex encounter during departure; 
• Wake vortex encounter during single runway arrival; 
• Missed approach during single runway arrival; 
• Wake vortex encounter during arrivals on CSPRs; 
• Missed approach during arrivals on CSPRs; 
• Higher traffic rates in TMA, holding, sector, or on runway; 
• Turbulence; 
• More landings in crosswind; 
• Transitions between ICAO and ATC-Wake Separation Mode; 
• Effects on ICAO Separation Mode. 
For some of these scenarios, potential enhancements have been proposed, which have 
been addressed by ATC-Wake operational experts in WP4 Operational Feasibility (D4_7). 
Development of human operator models 
Models for the performance of human operators during single runway arrivals have been 
developed (in particular for the ATC supervisor, arrival sequence manager, initial approach 
controller, intermediate approach controller, tower controller and aircraft crews). The models 
describe monitoring, interaction with ATC-Wake systems and decision making of the 
controllers and aircraft crews. The human operator performance models have been 
developed and included in an integrated model, representing the performance of human 
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operators, related aircraft movements, meteorological influences and technical systems 
(surveillance systems, communications systems and ATC-Wake systems). 
Validation of the quantitative safety assessment 
To validate the safety assessment method, a number of activities have been carried out: 
• A comparison between two wake vortex evolution models (VFS and VORTEX) was 
made, taking into consideration conditions far and close from the ground. The models 
seem to predict different behaviour of vortices even for cases without crosswind, i.e. 
further investigation might be needed in order to better understand this phenomena. 
• A comparison between available wake encounter models with different complexity was 
made, including validation against computed maximum bank angles observed during 
wake encounter flight simulations. A fair agreement of the results was noted. 
• A newly developed Petri-Net (PN) aircraft flight path evolution model was validated 
against the AMAAI toolset developed for the analysis of in-trail following aircraft. It was 
concluded that the PN model provides sufficiently accurate results for use in WAVIR. 
Quantitative safety assessment methodology 
For the quantitative assessment of the wake vortex induced risk related to the ATC-Wake 
operation with reduced separation, there are three main issues to consider:  
• The controller working with the ATC-Wake system has to instruct the pilot to initiate a 
wake vortex avoidance manoeuvre, in case an ATC-Wake warning/alert is raised. 
• If one or more ATC-Wake system components provide wrong or erroneous advice, there 
will be a higher risk on the presence of (severe) wake vortices. The consequences might 
be CATASTROPHIC, because reduced separation is applied. 
• The separation distance/time will vary along the flight track, and will usually not be 
exactly the same as the separation minima advised by the Separation Mode Planner. 
 
The 'classical' WAVIR methodology, which originates from S-Wake, has been used to assess 
wake vortex induced risk. To cope with all the above issues, WAVIR has been extended with 
a graph and decision theory based structure. A variety of mathematical models and 
techniques (including fault trees, discrete and continuous Bayesian Belief Nets and vines, 
and Petri Nets) are introduced to incorporate the role of humans working with ATC-Wake. 
The details of the model are described in ATC-Wake D3_5b. 
Evaluation of safe separation distances and capacity 
To determine the crosswind threshold values, above which reduced separation for all aircraft 
combinations may be applied, three simulation studies have been carried out: 
• Single runway arrivals; 
• Single runway departures; 
• Closely spaced parallel runway arrivals. 
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Indicative separation minima have been determined for all three operations, and an initial 
assessment of throughput improvements has been made using analytical models based on 
aircraft spacing, queuing models and sequencing approximation methods. These indicative 
separation minima for the three operations are given in the Table below. A crosswind 
climatology based on 400000 observations at 10 European airports has been used. 
 
Indicative separation minima per crosswind interval for the ATC-Wake operations 
 
Proposed separation Crosswind  
 
Crosswind 
interval 
SRD 
operation 
SRA  
operation 
CSPRA 
operation 
(non- 
segregated) 
CSPRA 
 operation 
(segregated) 
CSPRA 
operation 
(semi- 
segregated) 
Crosswind 
probability 
per 
interval 
0
 
≤ uc ≤ 1m/s ICAO ICAO 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.080 
1 ≤ uc ≤ 2m/s ICAO ICAO ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.208 
2 ≤ uc ≤ 3m/s 120s 2.5NM ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.206 
3 ≤ uc ≤ 4m/s 90s 2.5NM ICAO 2.5NM ICAO 0.164 
4 ≤ uc ≤ 5m/s 90s 2.5NM ICAO 3.0NM 3.5NM 0.118 
5 ≤ uc ≤ 6m/s 60s 2.5NM ICAO 3.0NM 3.5NM 0.081 
6 ≤ uc ≤ 8m/s 60s 2.5NM 3.0NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.053 
8m/s ≤ uc 60s 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 2.5NM 0.090 
9.2 Recommendations 
Since 2005, application of the European Operational Concept Validation Methodology (E-
OCVM) and the use of the Validation Data Repository (VDR) is required by all new 
EC/EUROCONTROL ATM related projects. E-OCVM provides a common approach to 
validation of operational concepts as a pre-requisite for industrialisation and operational 
introduction. A Safety Case, Human Factors Case, Benefits Case and Technology Case will 
need to be produced before the ATC-Wake system can be used at European airports. In this 
respect, a full Safety Case shall take into account the local airport weather climatology and 
specific local ATC/pilot procedures for wake vortex mitigation. 
During the validation activities, it appeared that both real (measured) data as well as a 
sufficiently validated aircraft performance and dynamics model for departures are not yet 
available. Sufficient validation of the ATC-Wake single runway departure safety assessment 
results was therefore not possible. It is therefore recommended to extend the well known 
AMAAI toolset (developed for EUROCONTROL) for the analysis of in trail following aircraft 
during arrivals with a module dedicated to departure operations. Wake vortex evolution 
models and wake encounter models for departures also appeared not sufficiently validated.  
In view of the above, actual implementation of the ATC-Wake operation at European airports 
is envisaged around 2010 at the earliest. It is recommended to involve airport authorities and 
ATC centres for gathering the required data to build the Safety Case. 
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Appendix A Single runway arrivals 
 
Figure A-1 – Overview of risk results in case of 0 m/s crosswind 
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Figure A-2 – Overview of risk results in case of 1 m/s crosswind 
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Figure A-3 – Overview of risk results in case of 2 m/s crosswind 
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Figure A-4 – Overview of risk results in case of 4 m/s crosswind 
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Appendix B Single runway departures 
 
Figure B-1 – Overview of risk results in case of 0 m/s crosswind 
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Figure B-2 – Overview of risk results in case of 1 m/s crosswind 
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Figure B-3 – Overview of risk results in case of 2 m/s crosswind 
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Figure B-4 – Overview of risk results in case of 3 m/s crosswind 
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Figure B-5 – Overview of risk results in case of 4 m/s crosswind 
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Figure B-6 – Overview of risk results in case of 5 m/s crosswind 
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Appendix C Closely spaced parallel runways 
 
Figure C-1 – Overview of risk results in case of 1m/s crosswind 
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Figure C-2 – Overview of risk results in case of 3m/s crosswind 
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Figure C-3 – Overview of risk results in case of 5m/s crosswind 
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Figure C-4 – Overview of risk results in case of 7m/s crosswind 
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Figure C-5 – Overview of risk results in case of 9m/s crosswind 
 
